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Abstract
Statement of the problem: Positive psychology has led to a proliferation of research on
many positive phenomena, however there lacks theoretical organization among constructs
(Gable & Haidt, 2005; Held, 2004; Pawelski, 2016). In an effort to ground research on
diverse but related subjects, Christine Winston (2016) suggested that there may be a more
basic developmental process underpinning phenomena. Her theory relies heavily on
existentialism and humanistic psychology with no data analysis included as empirical
validation. The goal of this thesis is to provide a scientific analysis of the credibility of
her claims.
Methods: The first manuscript is a metrical analysis to account for a lack of empirical
scales in existentialism and humanism. A summary scale is provided to specifically
assess development of happiness as described by Winston (2016). Exploratory and
confirmatory factor analyses are used with a sample of 310 undergraduate psychology
students to accomplish this goal. The second manuscript considers physiological
underpinnings to Winston’s (2016) theory. Canonical correlation analysis is used on a
sample of 20 psychology students (10 undergraduate, 10 graduate) to consider
relationships between Winston’s (2016) forms of happiness and biomarkers cortisol,
interleukin-6, and DNA methylation.
Summary of results: Results were significant and directionally as hypothesized drawing
from Winston’s (2016) theory. This demonstrates a more basic role of happiness in
human functioning. Furthermore, seeing an epigenetic link, this provides preliminary
evidence for possible ways to change stable happiness.
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Preface
The thesis is submitted in manuscript format. Two manuscripts are provided:
Measuring positivity: Existentialist and humanist metrical additions, and Epigenetic
underpinnings of happiness. Neither has been submitted for publication yet. Measuring
positivity will be submitted first, to the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
The second manuscript explicitly relies on the metrical development of the first
manuscript. For this reason, Epigenetic underpinnings of happiness will be submitted
second, to Developmental Science.

v

Table of Contents
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….ii
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………...iii
Preface……………………………………………………………………………...v
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………...vi
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………….vii
List of Figures………………………………………………………………………viii
List of Appendices………………………………………………………………….ix
Manuscript 1……………………………………………………………………......1
Manuscript 2………………………………………………………………………..77

vi

List of Tables
Manuscript 1:
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Five needs satisfaction measures questionnaire results
Table 3: Orientations toward happiness questionnaire results
Table 4: Fear checklist questionnaire results
Table 5: Ethical position questionnaire results
Table 6: Self-control scale questionnaire results
Table 7: Personal fulfilment inventory overall fit
Table 8: Personal fulfilment inventory item level results
Table 9: Personal fulfilment inventory multiple regression results
Manuscript 2:
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Correlations within happiness variables
Table 3: Correlations within stress response variables
Table 4: Correlations between happy and stress response variables
Table 5: Canonical correlation overall results
Table 6: Linear combination results
Table 7: Linear combination coefficients and correlations
Table 8: Overall redundancy analysis

vii

List of Figures
Manuscript 1:
Figure 1: Conceptual diagram of theory examined
Figure 2: Matrix of developmental considerations in creating the personal
fulfilment inventory

viii

List of Appendices
Manuscript 1:
Appendix A: Background on Winston’s (2016) theory
Appendix B: Further details on scale creation methods
Appendix C: Personal fulfilment inventory items and scoring

ix

Manuscript 1
Measuring positivity: Existentialist and humanist metrical additions
Joshua Ray Tanzer
Lisa L. Harlow
Nasser H. Zawia
Nichea Spillane
Genesis Jimenez
University of Rhode Island
Publication status: unpublished, will be submitted to the Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology
Author Note
Correspondence should be addressed to Joshua Ray Tanzer, Department of
Psychology, University of Rhode Island, 142 Flagg Road, Kingston RI, 02881, USA, email: joshua_tanzer@my.uri.edu
Lisa L. Harlow, Department of Psychology, University of Rhode Island, 142
Flagg Road, Kingston RI, 02881.
Nasser H. Zawia, Department of Biological and Pharmaceutical Sciences,
University of Rhode Island, Avedisian Hall, 7 Greenhouse Road, Kingston, RI 02881
Nichea Spillane, Department of Psychology, University of Rhode Island, 142
Flagg Road, Kingston RI, 02881.
Lisa L. Harlow’s research was supported in part by a National Institutes of Health
grant G20RR030883, PI: D. H. DeHayes.

1

Abstract
Positive psychology has led to a proliferation of metrics for measuring positive
phenomena, however there lacks theoretical organization among constructs (Gable &
Haidt, 2005; Held, 2004; Pawelski, 2016). In an effort to ground research on diverse but
related subjects, Christine Winston (2016) suggested that there may be a more basic
developmental process underpinning phenomena. Drawing from humanism,
existentialism, and moral psychology, she argued for the development of personal
worldview, however she did not provide empirical validation of her theory. There are
two aims to this analysis: to refine scales for measuring constructs in these subfields that
do not usually use questionnaires, and to compile from subscales one summary metric
measuring development within Winston’s (2016) theory. This is done using a sample of
310 undergraduate psychology students. Scale revisions and McDonald’s coefficient
omega (Dunn, Baguley, & Brunsden, 2014; McDonald, 1999) are reported and general
recommendations for researchers are provided.
Keywords: authentic happiness, humanism, existentialism, scale development
Introduction
A key focus of positive psychology research has been to improve measurement of
the important things in life (Gable & Haidt, 2005). Scales have been developed to
measure various definitions of happiness itself, (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin,
1985; Fordyce, 1988; Hills & Argyle, 2002; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999; Peterson,
Park, & Seligman, 2005; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) as well as happy behaviors
including aptitude for gratitude (McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002), awareness of
personal strengths (Govindji & Linley, 2007), experience of hope (Snyder et al., 1991),
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and perseverance when times get tough (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly,
2007). The goal has been to refocus the field of psychology away from what goes wrong
toward what goes right (Gable & Haidt, 2005).
With so many individual constructs of happiness, the criticism has been raised
that the field lacks theoretical guidance beyond the general pursuit of “positivity” (Gable
& Haidt, 2005; Held, 2004; Pawelski, 2016). What stands as one of the largest theories
to organize positive phenomena is positive psychology pioneer Martin Seligman’s (2002)
authentic happiness theory. This theory considers three different sources of happiness:
pleasure, engagement, and meaning. Pleasure is characterized by fun and excitement.
An example might be the glitz and glam of a Hollywood party. Engagement is
characterized by doing, focusing intently until time stands still. An example might be the
jazz musician in a solo, carefully in tune with the energy of the band. Meaning is
characterized by connection to something broader than the self. An example might be
working for the peace corps: though the work may not be fun or interesting to do, it is
inherently worth doing and can provide purpose to one’s life.
While the original theory from Seligman (2002) has been well received, it has
been criticized as shallow, overly reducing the full experience of life to happy
experiences without accounting for real negativity (Froh, 2004; Gable & Haidt, 2005;
Held, 2004; Pawelski, 2016; Seligman, 2011; Waterman, 2013). To account for this,
Christine Winston (2016) integrated Seligman’s (2002) theory to ground it in a broader
psychological framework. She draws from existentialism and humanism as subfields
studying similar subjects to positive psychology but with different theoretical
foundations. Importantly, her theory does not downplay the experience of negativity, but
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rather incorporates it as an aspect of personal affective development. She argues that
there may be a simpler developmental process that underpins development, in essence the
development of personal worldview. From there, constructs including happiness,
existential despair, and sense of morality can be identified as aspects of this greater
developmental transition over the lifespan (Winston, 2016).
The whole system is generally organized similar to Seligman’s (2002) theory.
Instead of three sources of happiness, three lives are described: the pleasurable life
(related to pleasure), the good life (related to engagement), and the meaningful life
(related to meaning). Where Seligman (2002) is reluctant to describe these as anything
more than personalities or aptitudes for phenomena of happiness, Winston (2016)
suggests that they are along a developmental process driven by Abraham Maslow’s
(Maslow & Frager, 1987) hierarchy of needs. As increasingly abstracted needs are met
within Maslow’s (1987) humanistic theoretical frame, subjective affective experience can
be determined. This includes happiness as defined by Seligman (2002), as well as
existential despair as defined Søren Kierkegaard (1989; originally published in 1849).
Lastly, the dynamics of delight and ennui ultimately result in a sense of morality and
justice as defined by Lawrence Kohlberg (1984). The thought is that there is an
interconnected web of psychological constructs that all progress along the same basic
path of three stages. Rather than viewing these as unrelated constructs in psychology, an
integration of theories across disciplines is offered. Development is simplified to a
process of increasing awareness of and acceptance of life’s complexity. For a longer
discussion of Winston’s (2016) theory, see Appendix A.
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There are two aims for this analysis: to enable quantitative, empirical research
within Winston’s (2016) theory; and to provide some preliminary evaluation of the
theory. Positive psychology as a field tends to be quantitative (Froh, 2004; Pawelski,
2016; Waterman, 2013), and a scale has been developed for measuring Seligman’s (2002)
definitions of happiness. That said, research in existentialism, humanism, and moral
psychology is not generally scale based, rarely quantitative, and sometimes not even
empirical (Lapsley, 1996; van Bruggen, Vos, Westerhof, Bohlmeijer, & Glas, 2015;
Waterman, 2013).
Methods
Exploratory factor analysis will be used first to evaluate scale functionality so as
to not constrain scales to their expected forms. The goal will be to identify the
compatible from the problematic question items to simplify scales. They will be
examined as individual subscales and as combined metrics to explore the conditions in
which items work together. Factor analyses will be performed before and after removal
of question items to identify how changes impacted the scales. Confirmatory factor
analysis will then be used to assess explicit hypothesized relationships relating
specifically to Winston’s (2016) theory. Correlations will be examined between
individual items to identify compatible metrics for the PFI and model fit will be assessed.
Lastly, McDonald’s coefficient omega (Dunn, Baguley, & Brunsden, 2014) will be
calculated and reported for all scales. Cronbach's coefficient alpha examines correlations
between scale items and may be biased high, especially for scales with many items.
Coefficient omega, though less often reported, examines the underlying factor structure
of a scale to be more precise in identifying internal consistency.
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Materials
The five main scales considered in the first aim of this analysis are the five needs
satisfaction measures (FNSM), orientations toward happiness questionnaire (OTH), fear
checklist (FC), ethic position questionnaire (EPQ), and self-control scale (SCS).
Selecting question items from these scales, the personal fulfilment inventory (PFI) will be
compiled as a summary metric of development across these constructs, the second aim of
this analysis. Additionally, the Satisfaction with life scale (SWLS, Diener, Emmons,
Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) will be used to assess functionality of the PFI.
The FNSM contains 72 items across five subscales. The subscales directly
correspond to Maslow’s (1987) hierarchy of needs: physiological needs (15 items), safety
security needs (15 items), belongingness needs (15 items), esteem needs (15 items), and
self-actualization needs (12 items). For the first four needs, the statement “I am
completely satisfied with” is provided followed by a number of statements with which to
agree or disagree. Example items include “the amount of water that I drink every day,”
and “the camaraderie I share with my colleagues.” For self-actualization, statements
alone are provided; for example, “I completely accept all aspects of myself.” Items are
rated on a Likert like scale from 1 (representing strongly disagree) to 5 (representing
strongly agree).
The OTH contains 18 items across three subscales. The subscales directly
correspond to Seligman’s (2002) forms of happiness: pleasure (6 items), engagement (6
items), and meaning (6 items). Participants are provided statements with which to agree
or disagree. Examples include “I seek out situations that challenge my skills and
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abilities,” and “I am always very absorbed in what I do.” Items are rated on a Likert like
scale from 1 (representing strongly disagree) to 5 (representing strongly agree).
The FC contains 18 items across three subscales. Though this scale was not
specifically developed in relation to Kierkegaard’s (1989) writing, the subscales are taken
as corresponding to Kierkegaard’s (1989) forms of despair: despair to not have a self
(fear of loss of control, 6 items), despair to not be oneself (fear of loss of social relations,
6 items), and despair to be oneself (fear of loss of identity, 6 items). Participants are
provided single word concepts that might spark existential fear. Examples include
“weakness,” and “disapproval.” Participants are asked to identify whether or not they
fear each item as a binary response, yes or no.
The EPQ contains 20 items across two subscales. This scale was not created for
measuring Kohlberg’s (1984) developmental, but the subscales are taken as
corresponding to two of Kohlberg’s (1984) developmental stages of morality:
preconventional thought (moral relativism, 10 items) and postconventional/principled
thought (moral idealism, 10 items). Participants are provided phrases with which to
agree or disagree. Examples include “people should make certain that their actions never
intentionally harm another even to a small degree,” and “different types of morality
cannot be compared as to ‘rightness.’” Items are rated on a Likert like scale from 1
(representing completely disagree) to 9 (representing completely agree).
The SCS contains 10 items, 7 of which are reverse scored. Like the EPQ, this
scale was not created for measuring Kohlberg’s (1984) theory, however it was taken as
corresponding to Kohlberg’s (1984) conventional morality stage. Participants are
provided statements and asked to assess relevance to themselves. Examples include “I

7

get distracted easily,” and “I’m good at resisting temptation.” Items are rated on a Likert
like scale from 1 (representing not at all like me) to 5 (representing very much like me).
The PFI will be created from these scales. The composed final metric will
represent a three by four matrix of theoretical interactions. See Figure 1 for a conceptual
diagram and Figure 2 for the matrix of theoretical interactions. For additional details on
scale compilation, see Appendix B. The final metric will range from 0 (representing low
fulfilment) to 4 (representing rich fulfilment). The final items selected for the scale and
details on scoring will be provided in Appendix C.
Lastly, the SWLS will be used in evaluating the functionality of the PFI. This
scale contains 5 items. This scale is often viewed as a general metric of contentment
without explicit operationalizations of happiness. Participants are provided statements
with which to agree or disagree. Examples include “I am satisfied with my life,” and “so
far I have gotten the important things I want in life.” Items are rated on a Likert scale
from 1 (representing strongly disagree) to 7 (representing strongly agree).
Participants
Participants were undergraduate psychology students at the University of Rhode
Island compensated with partial course credit. The full sample included 310 participants,
however 43 were removed due to active experience of trauma within the past three
months or extensively missing data. Participants actively experiencing trauma were
removed because the goal of this analysis was to examine basal happiness, trauma being
an atypical state of affective experience. Though screening participants based on trauma
may induce a selection bias, this allows for more generalizable conclusions. The final
sample was of 267 participants. For evaluating metrics in the first aim, 133 cases were
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examined; for creating the PFI in the second aim, the 134 remaining cases were
examined. The range of ages was from 18 to 55, however the majority of students were
young adults (M=20.08 years, SD=3.30 years). Most students were in their second year
of college, however there were students from year one through year five (M=2.3 years of
college, SD=0.94 years of college). The majority of the sample identified as cisgender
and female (84%). The majority of the sample primarily identified white (74%) with
similarly small proportions of participants identifying as Latinx (8%), African American
(7%), mixed race (6%), and Asian/Pacific islander (4%); there was one participant who
identified as American Indian.
Results
Background
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients for the unedited
scales. Generally speaking, most scales were more or less normally distributed although
with some kurtosis (i.e., range of skewness from -0.82 to 0.87; range of kurtosis from 0.67 to 3.42). It was slightly concerning that all subscales of the orientation toward
happiness scale were kurtotic (pleasure: kurtosis=2.48; engagement: kurtosis=1.05;
meaning: kurtosis=1.67; total scale: kurtosis=3.43). Though not ideal, these values are
within potentially reasonable research limits per Harlow (2014), and were deemed
acceptable for the analysis.
Aim 1: Questionnaire revision
Five Needs Satisfaction Measures (FNSM)
The unedited FNSM demonstrated strong measures of internal consistency,
however the combined scale was not very parsimonious. Omega for subscales ranged
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from 0.88 to 0.95, however the combined questionnaire provided omega=0.97. This may
be in part because the combined questionnaire contains 72 questions. Correlations
between individual items were generally positive, significant, with a large range of values
from small to large (generally ranging from r=0.17 to r=0.33; the smallest r=-0.06,
p=0.3486; the largest r=0.86, p<0.0001). Visual examinations of scatter plots between
subscales were generally elliptical and clearly positively correlated. Participants were
similarly satisfied on all levels of need satisfaction: physiological needs, M=3.41
(SD=0.63); safety-security needs, M=3.75 (SD=0.58); belongingness needs, M=3.75
(SD=0.58); esteem needs, M=3.60 (SD=0.68); self-actualization needs, M=3.20
(SD=0.80); total need satisfaction, M=3.57 (SD=0.52).
Given the large size of this questionnaire (72 questions total), analysis of
subscales independently was given priority over analyzing the scale as one composite.
The full results for all factor analyses of the FNSM can be found in Table 2. The
physiological need satisfaction subscale was analyzed first, for single factor structure.
The first eigenvalue was noticeably larger than the rest (first eigenvalue=7.21), however
the following eigenvalues were not unsubstantial (second eigenvalue=2.24). The first
three eigenvalues were all above one, however, the first eigenvalue accounted for 48% of
the variance, just barely less than the 50% cut off suggested by Harlow (2014). The scree
plot demonstrated the second factor slightly before the elbow, but the first eigenvalue was
much larger and accounted for nearly 50% of the variance, so this was not considered a
threat to unidimensionality. The factor pattern provided strong factor loadings, generally
ranging from 0.40 to 0.75, the full range from 0.29 to 0.80. Given the coherent factor
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pattern, distinct primary eigenvalue, and large value for coefficient omega, no edits are
recommended for the physiological need satisfaction subscale of the FNSM.
A similar result was represented in the safety-security need satisfaction subscale.
The first eigenvalue was much larger than the rest, although the first four eigenvalues
were above one (first eigenvalue=5.95; second eigenvalue=2.15). The first eigenvalue
only accounted for 40% of the variance, which was a bit low. That said, though the
elbow of the scree plot was not a sharp turn, it was clear that the second eigenvalue was
after the elbow. The factor pattern for the single factor extraction included large
loadings, generally around 0.55 to 0.70. The smallest loading was 0.43, while the largest
was 0.79. No edits were recommended for the safety-security subscale because of the
large primary eigenvalue, factor loadings, and coefficient omega.
Belongingness needs demonstrated slightly clearer one factor structure. As
before, the first factor was clearly the largest (eigenvalue=7.21) with multiple
eigenvalues above one (second eigenvalue=2.24; third eigenvalue=1.13). However, the
scree plot demonstrated a sharper bend in the elbow than for the previous two subscales
while the first factor was still the only factor before the elbow. The first factor accounted
for nearly half of the variance, 48%. Factor loadings were very large, the range from
0.32 to 0.81 with the majority above 0.70. No edits were suggested for this subscale.
The esteem needs satisfaction subscale had a fairly simple structure. The first
eigenvalue was large (eigenvalue=8.89) while the second eigenvalue was the only
additional eigenvalue above one (eigenvalue=1.87). This scree plot had a flat and sharp
elbow, though the second eigenvalue may have been before the elbow. The range of
factor pattern loadings was not as wide as previous subscales (from 0.69 to 0.81), almost
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all of the factor loadings were near or above 0.75. This scale may be benefited by
simplification to increase parsimony, seeing a large value for omega (omega=0.95).
Despite this, no edits were suggested because it clearly functions as a single scale with
one primary factor.
Lastly, the self-actualization needs satisfaction subscale showed the most
evidence of single factor structure. The first factor eigenvalue was the largest and sole
eigenvalue before the elbow of the scree plot. Its value was large (eigenvalue=7.08)
while the second eigenvalue was only slightly above one (eigenvalue=1.11).
Additionally, the first factor accounted for 59% of the variance. Factor loadings showed
an appropriate range of values, all large, most around 0.80, (from 0.56 to 0.86), and
omega was quite large for this subscale (omega=0.93). No edits were suggested.
Next, a factor analysis including all 72 total questions was performed to assess the
feasibility of the scale as one measure of need satisfaction in general, as well as the
underlying factor structure composed of five levels of need fulfilment. Though there
were 16 eigenvalues greater than one, this is likely in part because there were so many
question items on the scale. Moreover, there was a sharp gradient between the early
eigenvalues (first eigenvalue=22.44; second eigenvalue=6.07). It was after four factors
had been extracted that more than 50% of the variance had been explained (at this point,
51% of the variance had been accounted for). The scree plot was supportive of the
theoretical five factor solution, as there were clearly five factors before the elbow, the
sixth at the bend. Looking at the factor pattern when only one factor was extracted, all
items had sufficient size loadings. That said, with so many questions, an enormous value

12

for omega (0.97), and five factors before the elbow of the scree plot, it is not advised to
use the FNSM in its entirety as one metric of satisfaction as it is clearly unparsimonious.
To assess the underlying factor structure, five factors were extracted and rotated
obliquely. This was supported by the scree plot as well as the theory underpinning the
questionnaire characterizing five sources of need satisfaction. Interfactor correlations
were small to moderate, ranging from 0.22 to 0.47. Factor loadings were difficult to
interpret as items were frequently complex. All items had loadings on at least one factor
that were sufficiently large (i.e., > |0.30|). Though many items did not demonstrate
simple structure, there were trends in how the factor subscales loaded. The physiological
needs satisfaction items tended to load onto factors three and four; the safety-security
needs satisfaction items tended to load onto factor three and occasionally onto factor
four; the belongingness needs satisfaction items tended to load onto factor two and
occasionally onto five; the esteem needs satisfaction items tended to load onto factors
two and one. The self-actualization needs items showed the simplest structure, tending to
load onto factor one. The implications of this factor structure are informative as they
provide support for Maslow’s (1987) ordering of the hierarchy. For example, items of
adjacent stages were more likely to load onto the same factors than items of distant
stages.
However, the results also highlight that the factor structure was complex and
lacked parsimony. Items were frequently complex and items that were not complex from
the same subscale did not always load onto the same factors. These results demonstrate
both theoretical validity of the questionnaire, and also the pragmatic limitations of the
questionnaire. Though no items were suggested to be removed from the questionnaire,
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administering all 72 is not necessary. Seeing individual subscales with clear factor
structures, researcher interested in studying need satisfaction could consider individual
subscales rather than all 72 items.
Orientations Toward Happiness (OTH)
Despite inflated kurtosis, internal consistency was acceptable for the unedited
OTH. The combined scale demonstrated good consistency, omega=0.81. The subscale
for happiness as meaning was more internally consistent than the subscales for pleasure
or engagement, though all values were within reasonable research limits (meaning:
omega=0.78; pleasure: omega=0.73; engagement: omega=0.70). Individual item
correlations were small to moderate and significant, generally ranging from r=0.15 to
r=0.30. There were two slightly negative item correlations, however these items were
insignificant and on different subscales (r=-0.11, p=0.0739; r=-0.02; p=0.7625). The vast
majority of individual item correlations were positive, the largest correlation r=0.58,
p<0.0001. Visual examination of scatter plots between subscales were generally
elliptical and clearly demonstrating positive relationships. Participants were well
oriented toward all forms of happiness: pleasure, M=3.64 (SD=0.58); engagement,
M=3.27 (SD=0.55); meaning, M=3.69 (SD=0.61); total happiness, M=3.53 (SD=0.45).
The full results for the OTH analysis can be found in Table 3. The questionnaire
was analyzed first as one summed metric of happiness, then as individual subscales. A
three factor structure was apparent, despite some mixed results. The first six eigenvalues
were all at or above one (first eigenvalue=4.39; second eigenvalue=2.27; third
eigenvalue=1.69; fourth eigenvalue=1.21; fifth eigenvalue=1.15; sixth eigenvalue=1.00),
however the scree plot indicated clearly three factors before the bend. These three factors
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accounted for 46% of the variance. Given theoretical design around three sources of
happiness, the scree plot implying three factors before the elbow, and nearly 50% of the
variance explained by the first three factors, three factors were extracted.
Subscales were generally distinguished by their loadings, however there were
some items that were complex. Items on the pleasure subscale tended to load onto the
second factor; items on the engagement subscale tended to load onto the third factor; and
items on the meaning subscale tended to load onto the first factor. Primary factor
loadings were large, generally around 0.55 to 0.75 (full range from 0.30 to 0.79). There
were some items with low and indiscriminate loadings, for example one item which
yielded factor one loading=0.21; factor two loading=0.24; and factor three loading=0.30.
Investigating these items within subscales will be important to clarify the scale.
The pleasure subscale was analyzed first. The first eigenvalue was noticeably
larger than the rest (first eigenvalue=2.53; second eigenvalue=0.97), and the scree plot
demonstrated one factor before the bend. Though this is evidence of a one factor
structure, the first factor alone only accounted for 42% of the variance. One factor was
extracted. The range of factor loadings was from 0.45 to 0.75, however the majority of
loadings were above 0.60. The lowest loading item was a complex loading on the
previous three factor analysis of all 18 items (“I go out of my way to feel euphoric”).
Seeing as it was the least contributive to the subscale and muddied the combined scale,
the analysis was rerun with the item removed. This had minimal impact on the
eigenvalues (first eigenvalue=2.40; second eigenvalue=0.86), the scree plot, or
coefficient omega (both instances, after rounding omega=0.73) but it did improve the
proportion of variance accounted for to 48%. It may be worth considering removal of
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this item for future research, especially if the full scale is being used to contrast these
sources of happiness.
The engagement subscale was less distinctively single factor than the pleasure
subscale. The first two eigenvalues were both above one (first eigenvalue=2.42; second
eigenvalue=1.01) and the first eigenvalue was only accounted for 40% of the variance,
the first two accounting for 57% of the variance. The scree plot was difficult to interpret,
unclear whether or not the second eigenvalue was before the elbow or slightly after.
Because of the theory and intended applications of the subscale, only one factor was
extracted. Most factor loadings were large, above 0.65; however, one was relatively
smaller, (“regardless of what I am doing, time passes very quickly,” loading=0.38).
Additionally, this smaller item was a complex loading in the first factor analysis of all 18
items. The analysis was rerun with the item removed. This change improved clarity of
single factor structure. The first eigenvalue was the only value above one (first
eigenvalue=2.33; second eigenvalue=0.83) and it accounted for 47% of the variance. The
scree plot now showed clearly one factor before the elbow. All factor loadings were
large, from 0.64 to 0.71. Lastly, removing this items improved internal consistency for
the subscale from omega=0.70 to omega=0.72. Researchers interested in the OTH should
consider removing this item.
The meaning subscale demonstrated a one-factor structure. The first eigenvalue
was well above the rest (first eigenvalue=2.82), though the second eigenvalue was very
close to one (eigenvalue=0.99). That said, the first factor accounted for only 47% of the
variance, while the adding the second factor increased the total variance accounted for to
64%. The scree plot showed one factor before the bend. This all suggests that there is
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one dominant factor. One factor was extracted. Loadings were generally large, around
0.65 to 0.85. There was one item (“I have spent a lot of time thinking about what life
means and how I fit into its big picture,”) which loaded relatively less than the other
items (loading=0.48). This item was also a complex loading on the initial 18 item three
factor analysis. Additionally, there was one item that had a slightly complex loading in
the three-factor analysis of all 18 items, that had a slightly lower factor loading relative to
the other items in this analysis (“In choosing what to do, I always take into account
whether it will benefit other people,” loading=0.60). Both of these items were removed
and the analysis rerun. This change distinguished the single factor structure further. The
first eigenvalue remained large (eigenvalue=2.40) while the second eigenvalue lowered
(eigenvalue=0.74), the scree plot remained similar to its original shape. Proportions of
variance accounted for increased, the first factor now accounting for 60% of the variance.
Factor loadings were all large, from 0.71 to 0.88. Omega did increase for the subscale,
though only marginally from 0.78 to 0.79. Researchers interested in the OTH should
consider removing these items, especially if interested in comparing the three sources of
happiness.
Having removed these items, the whole scale combining subscales could be
considered. Where before, with all 18 items, there was some evidence that there may
have been more than three factors, the scale now clearly demonstrated a three-factor
structure. The first three eigenvalues were well above one, the fourth eigenvalue was
slightly above one but only barely so (first eigenvalue=3.67; second eigenvalue=2.12;
third eigenvalue=1.62; fourth eigenvalue=1.10); the scree plot showed clearly that three
factors came before the bend; and the first three factors accounted for 53% of the
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variance. Removing the problematic items did reduce coefficient omega slightly from
0.81 to 0.79, but these values are still within acceptable limits. Extracting three factors
with a promax rotation provided clearer results. Primary factor loadings for each
subscale generally large (generally from 0.65 to 0.75, full range from 0.55 to 0.81).
Loadings on other factors were larger than would have been ideal, but still much smaller
relative to primary factors (generally loadings around 0.10 to 0.20, full range from -0.29
to 0.32). Interfactor correlations were small to moderate (pleasure and engagement:
r=0.13; pleasure and meaning: r=0.24; engagement and meaning: r=0.22). Removal of
four items ("I go out of my way to feel euphoric" on the pleasure subscale; "Regardless of
what I am doing, time passes very quickly" on the engagement subscale; and, "In
choosing what to do, I always take into account whether it will benefit other people" and
"I have spent a lot of time thinking about what life means and how I fit into its big
picture" on the meaning subscale) may be worth consideration to simplify the factor
structure.
Fear Checklist (FC)
The unedited FC had reasonable internal consistency for all but one subscale. The
overall metric was reasonably consistent (omega=0.82) and so too were the subscales for
fear of loss of social relations and control loss of social relations: omega=0.81; loss of
control: omega=0.78. However, consistency for fear of loss of identity was very low
(omega=0.59). Editing the FC will be essential. Individual item correlations were small
to moderate in size and significant, generally ranging from about r=0.10 to r=0.25. That
said, item correlations were occasionally quite small (e.g., r=0.01, p=0.8880) or even
negative (e.g., r=-0.16, p=0.0110). The highest correlation was r=0.54, p<0.0001. A
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visual examination of scatter plots between subscales demonstrated what appeared to be
positive relationships, but clearly there was much variation. Participants were generally
moderately fearful overall (M=8.11 fears, SD=3.93 fears). Participants were not
particularly fearful of loss of control (M=1.57 fears, SD=1.83 fears), but moderately
fearful of loss of social relations or loss of identity (social relations: M=3.53 fears,
SD=1.75 fears; loss of identity: M=3.00 fears, SD=1.58 fears).
The full results of the FC analysis can be found in Table 4. The first factor
analysis considered all 18 items with a promax rotation to identify all questions in
relation; next, individual subscales were considered in detail. The first five eigenvalues
were all above one (first eigenvalue=4.57; second eigenvalue=2.70; third
eigenvalue=1.54; fourth eigenvalue=1.15; fifth eigenvalue=1.01). That said, extracting
three factors, as was intended for the scale, resulted in 49% of the variance being
explained. Moreover, though the scree plot did not have a very sharp bend in the elbow,
it was only the first three eigenvalues that were before what bend there was. Because of
the scree plot, values close to one for the fourth and fifth eigenvalues, and the theoretical
design based on three sources of existential fear, three factors were extracted.
The factor pattern with three factors extracted was mixed. The fear of loss of
control and fear of loss of

social relations subscales were fairly distinct. Each had a

clear primary factor onto which items loaded (control: factor one; social relations: factor
two). There were some items that were complex or did not seem to load onto the same
factor as other items; however, most items had fairly simple structure with loadings onto
the primary factor around 0.65 to 0.75 and loadings onto other factors around 0.05 to
0.15. The fear of loss of identity subscale was less distinct. Three items were complex
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and uninformative, with small loadings onto all factors. Two items loaded primarily onto
factor one and one item loaded primarily onto factor three. Individual subscale analyses
provided clarity on cleaning this scale.
The fear of loss of control subscale was first analyzed, for single factor structure.
Only the first eigenvalue was larger than one (first eigenvalue=2.52; second
eigenvalue=0.96) and the scree plot identified only one factor before the bend. Though
this was strong evidence in support of a single factor structure, the first eigenvalue only
accounted for 42% of the variance, the first two accounting for 58%. Factor loadings for
one factor extracted were strong, most were around 0.60 to 0.75. There was one item
(“control”) for which the loading was only 0.30. This item also did not appear to load
onto the same primary item during the first factor analysis of all 18 items as did the other
items from this subscale. The item was removed and the analysis was rerun. This
clarified the structure. The first eigenvalue decreased slightly, but the second eigenvalue
decreased more (first eigenvalue=2.46, second eigenvalue=0.84). Additionally, the first
factor accounted for 48% of the variance, close to the 50% desired. The scree plot
showed a clear bend before the second eigenvalue. Item loadings were strong, all above
0.60, full range from 0.61 to 0.78. Lastly, removing control from the questionnaire
improved omega from 0.72 to 0.74. All in all, removing “control” from this subscale is
advised.
Factor analysis of the fear of loss of social relations subscale was performed and
one factor extracted to assess the factor structure. The first eigenvalue was clearly the
largest and the only eigenvalue above one (first eigenvalue=3.07; second
eigenvalue=0.86). The first factor alone accounted for 51% of the variance, and the scree

20

plot showed the second factor after the elbow. This strong evidence for a single factor
structure. Factor loadings were strong, around 0.75. The one exception was the item
(“honesty”) which was lower (loading=0.45). Further yet, this item did not primarily
load onto the same factor as the other items of this subscale. The factor analysis was
performed again with the item removed. The results were strong: the first eigenvalue was
still large (eigenvalue=2.92), but the second eigenvalue was smaller (eigenvalue=0.71)
and the first eigenvalue accounted for 58% of the variance. The scree plot showed
clearly one factor before the elbow and factor loadings were all large, almost all above
0.70, ranging from 0.69 to 0.81. Lastly, omega increased from 0.81 to 0.82. It is
recommended that researchers interested in the FC should consider removing “honesty”
from the social relations subscale.
The final subscale to be analyzed, fear of loss of identity, was now considered.
This scale also showed evidence of a two factor structure. The first two eigenvalues were
both above one (first eigenvalue=1.99; second eigenvalue=1.31) but more concerning
was that the first factor only accounted for 33% of the variance. It was difficult to assess
the scree plot because the eigenvalues were virtually linear. Extracting only one factor
identified three items with strong loadings (“failure:” loading=0.66; “disapproval:”
loading=0.83; and, “insignificance:” loading=0.75); two items with smaller loadings
(“other people’s opinions:” loading=0.44; “anonymity:” loading=0.34); and one item
which did not load at all onto the factor (“success:” loading=-0.01). Seeing such little
relation for this item, the analysis was repeated with “success” removed. This change did
simplify toward a one factor structure, yielding a scree plot with only one large
eigenvalue above one before the bend (first eigenvalue=2.46; second eigenvalue=0.84).
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The variance this accounted also improved, to 49% of the variance. After rounding, none
of the factor loadings had changed. This change did increase coefficient omega from
0.59 to 0.63, though this is still lower than would be desired. Researchers interested in
the FC should consider removing “success” from the loss of identity subscale, although
the overall integrity of the subscale may still be low for undergraduate populations.
The FC could be again considered now with items removed. Before there had
been concern that there may be more than three factors present. Removing fear of loss of
honesty, control, and success may have oversimplified the scale somewhat. The first four
eigenvalues were above one, however the third and fourth were very close to one (first
eigenvalue=4.40; second eigenvalue=2.41; third eigenvalue=1.15; fourth
eigenvalue=1.03). The first two accounted for 45% of the variance, the first three 53% of
the variance. Most concerning was the scree plot, which showed clearly two factors
before the bend, however the third factor was only at the elbow. Extracting three factors
with a promax rotation, there was still some complexity between subscales. The fear if
loss of control subscale still tended to load onto the first factor (range of loadings from
0.45 to 0.78). There was one item (“rejection”) which before showed simple structure
that now was complex (first factor loading=0.45; third factor loading=0.45). The fear of
loss of social relations subscale was more straightforward: most items loaded strongly
onto the second factor and only the second factor. All primary factor loadings were
above 0.70, and loadings onto other factors were no larger than 0.25, most near or below
|0.10|. As before, the fear of loss of identity subscale was the least coherent. There were
two items which loaded strongly onto the first factor with the fear of loss of control
subscale (“disapproval:” loading=0.72; and, “insignificance:” loading=0.73). There was
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one item that clearly loaded onto the third factor (“other people’s opinions:”
loading=0.88). The remaining items had small and complex loadings. This issue was
further demonstrated by interfactor correlations: there was virtually no correlation
between the second and third factors (first and second: r=0.26; first and third: r=0.24;
second and third: r=0.01).
To further clarify the subscales, the complex loadings here identified were
removed (“rejection” from the fear of loss of control subscale, and “disapproval” and
“insignificance” from the fear of loss of identity subscale). This did improve overall
scale functionality toward a three factor structure. It was only the first three eigenvalues
that were larger than one (first eigenvalue=3.46; second eigenvalue=1.90; third
eigenvalue=1.23; fourth eigenvalue=0.89). These first three eigenvalues accounted for
55% of the variance. Most importantly, there were clearly three factors before the elbow
on the scree plot. Factor loadings for a three-factor solution were mixed. Every item on
the fear of loss of control subscale had large loadings onto the second factor, ranging
from 0.40 to 0.82, although two items had larger loadings onto the third factor
(“weakness:” loading=0.45; “vulnerability:” loading=0.40). The fear of loss of social
relations remained strong, with all items loading clearly onto the first factor, with
loadings ranging from 0.65 to 0.79. The fear of loss of identity subscale did have two
items with strong loadings onto the third factor (“failure:” loading=0.70;
“insignificance:” loading=0.79), however one item remained small and indiscriminate
(“anonymity,” first factor loading=0.18; second factor loading=0.27; third factor
loading=0.26). Interfactor correlations increased, however factor three still had a small
correlation (first and second: r=0.25; first and third: r=0.09; second and third: r=0.35).
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Because a factor cannot be identified with fewer than three items, no further edits
were made. These results demonstrate that the FC needs work. Though the fear of loss
of control and fear of loss of social relations scales may provide meaningful results, the
fear of loss of identity subscale was consistently troublesome with somewhat low metrics
of internal consistency. Individual subscales may be appropriate for use, however using
the composite scale to distinguish three forms of existential fear within undergraduates
may be unhelpful. If the full scale is to be used, it is advised to use the 15 item scale
(where “control” is removed from the control subscale; “honesty” is removed from the
social relations subscale; and “success” is removed from the identity subscale). This
scale provided more evidence for a three-factor structure than the full scale and though
factor loadings were not ideally discriminate, they were simpler in structure than the full
scale. Individual subscales for the 15-item scale showed evidence for a single-factor
structure and all items had sufficiently large loadings. Lastly, after rounding the 15-item
scale had the same value for coefficient omega as the 18-item scale, however before
rounding internal consistency increased slightly (omega=0.82). Dropping additional
items is not advised for use: factor structure did not simplify and internal consistency for
the scale was lower (omega=0.71). These suggestions are reiterated in Table 4.
Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ)
The unedited EPQ was one of the most balanced questionnaires analyzed.
Internal consistency as a single metric and within subscales was strong but not excessive.
The combined metric and the subscale for relativism both provided omega=0.88, while
the subscale for idealism provided omega=0.86. Individual item correlations were
generally significant and small to moderate, about r=0.15 to r=0.40 (full range from r=-
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0.01 to r=0.83). The scatter plot between the two subscales was more or less elliptical
and demonstrated a clear positive relationship. Participants were advocates of relativism
and idealism alike. Though the mean for relativism (M=5.80, SD=1.26) was larger than
the mean for idealism (M=6.63, SD=1.38), this is not likely a meaningful difference given
the wide standard deviation. As could be predicted, the mean for the combined scale was
similar to the means for the subscales (M=6.22, SD=1.08).
Full results of the analysis can be found in Table 5. All items were examined
together in one factor analysis before the individual subscales were isolated for more
detail. Performing a factor analysis with a promax rotation did demonstrate a two factor
structure as expected with some variance remained to be explained. The first four
eigenvalues were all above one (first eigenvalue=6.10; second eigenvalue=3.65; third
eigenvalue=1.62; fourth eigenvalue=1.31). Although the third and fourth eigenvalues
were larger than desired, the first two eigenvalues did explain 49% of the variance and
the scree plot clearly showed two factors before the elbow. Examining rotated factor
loadings, the idealism subscale was simple in structure. Loadings onto the first factor
were generally large (generally around 0.65 to 0.75) and loadings onto the second factor
small (generally around 0.00 to |0.10|). The relativity subscale, on the other hand,
showed some complexity. There were eight items with strong loadings on the second
factor (generally around 0.65 to 0.75) with small loadings on the first factor (generally
around |0.05|). That said, there were two items with small loadings onto both factors
(“Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should
be allowed to formulate their own individual codes,” first factor loading=0.24, second
factor loading=0.13; and, “Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon
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the circumstances surrounding the action,” first factor loading=0.33; second factor
loading=0.17).
Examining subscales individually was informative, the relativity subscale was
considered first. The first eigenvalue was noticeably larger than the rest, though the first
two were greater than one (first eigenvalue=3.96; second eigenvalue=1.26). The scree
plot was difficult to interpret, as there was a smooth curve without a distinct elbow. That
said, the first eigenvalue did account for 50% of the variance, as is desired. Seeing a
large first eigenvalue that accounted for half of the variance and theoretical foundation as
a one factor subscale, one factor was extracted. Factor loadings were generally large,
around 0.60 to 0.80. The indiscriminate loadings from the first analysis of all 20 items
were again low (“Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that
individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes:” loading=0.22;
and, “Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances
surrounding the action:” loading=0.29). These items were removed and the analysis
rerun. This clarified the subscale, with now only the first eigenvalue greater than one
(first eigenvalue=4.53; second eigenvalue=0.84) and accounting for the majority of the
variance, 57%. The scree plot now showed clearly one factor before a distinct elbow.
All factor loadings were greater than 0.58, with most around 0.65 to 0.75. After
rounding, coefficient omega for the scale did not change, however it did increase before
rounding (omega=0.89). Researcher interested in the EPQ for undergraduates should
consider removing the two problematic items.
Next, the idealism subscale was considered. This scale showed greater risk for a
two-factor structure than the relativism subscale. Though the first eigenvalue was
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distinct, the second eigenvalue was larger than one and fell before the elbow of the scree
plot (first eigenvalue=4.62; second eigenvalue=1.41). Additionally, the first factor only
accounted for 46% of the variance, slightly less than the 50% cut off suggested by
Harlow (2014). The factor pattern seemed appropriate, all loadings greater than 0.50,
generally around 0.70 to 0.80. There were two items that were low relative to other items
(“People should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even to a
small degree:” loading=0.50; and, “It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of
others:” loading=0.53). Though these are not unreasonable values, the loadings were of
similar magnitude on the two factor extraction of all 20 items. To eliminate what may be
a second factor, they were removed and the analysis rerun. This simplified the scale
toward a one factor solution. The first eigenvalue was now the only eigenvalue larger
than one (first eigenvalue=4.52; second eigenvalue=0.89), accounting for 56% of the
variance, and the only factor falling before the elbow of the scree plot. All factor
loadings were at least 0.60, with most around 0.75. Coefficient omega for the scale
increased from 0.86 to 0.89. Researchers interested in using the EQP should consider
removing the two less central items.
Having identified noisy variables, the analysis was rerun on the 16-item scale
(with items “Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that
individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes,” and “Whether a
lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the
action,” removed from the relativism subscale and items “People should make certain
that their actions never intentionally harm another even to a small degree,” and “It is
never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others,” removed from the idealism subscale).
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A two-factor structure was more apparent. The third eigenvalue was still greater than
one, but only marginally so (first eigenvalue=5.68; second eigenvalue=3.41; third
eigenvalue=1.07). Furthermore, the first two eigenvalues accounted for 57% of the
variance and there were clearly only two factors before the bend of the scree plot. Factor
loadings were all simple, primary factor loadings ranging from 0.56 to 0.90 and
secondary factor loadings no greater than |0.10|. Coefficient omega was unchanged
(omega=0.88). The interfactor correlation was moderate (r=0.23). Seeing much clearer
division of items, researchers interested in discriminating ethical opinions among
undergraduates should consider the removal of the four items with lower loadings.
Self-Control Scale (SCS)
The unedited SCS, which did not have subscales, demonstrated appropriate
functionality. Internal consistency was somewhat low but within reasonable research
limits, providing omega=0.72. Individual item correlations were appropriate, generally
between 0.20 and 0.40, with a full range from 0.10 to 0.66. Participants on average had a
moderate amount of self-control (M=3.22, SD=0.70).
Full results can be found in Table 6. The factor analysis was concerning, as there
was evidence for as many as three factors in the scale. The first three eigenvalues were
all at or above one (first eigenvalue=3.77; second eigenvalue=1.59; third
eigenvalue=1.00), and the first eigenvalue only accounted for 38% of the variance.
Furthermore, the scree plot demonstrated three factors before the bend. One factor was
extracted because the scale was designed to represent the singular concept of self-control.
Factor loadings were all appropriate in size, most above 0.50, full range from 0.35 to
0.79. Though this scale may be functional as a one factor metric of self-control, the
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lower value of coefficient omega and evidence for multiple factor structure remained a
concern. The lowest loading item (“I refuse things that are bad for me, even if they are
fun,” loading=0.35) was removed and the analysis rerun.
This improved the factor structure, however there was remaining evidence for a
two-factor structure. The first two eigenvalues were both above one (first
eigenvalue=3.68; second eigenvalue=1.27) and the first eigenvalue still only accounted
for 40% of the variance. The number of factors on the scree plot before the elbow
decreased to two, however the scale was designed for a one factor solution. Loadings
were similar to as before, all greater than 0.50. The smallest two factors were for the
only two items that are not reverse scored (“I’m good at resisting temptation,”
loading=0.52; and, “people would say that I have very strong self-discipline,”
loading=0.53). This may indicate that there is a measurable difference between the
presence of self-discipline and the absence thereof. The analysis was rerun using only
the items that were reverse scored, representing a lack of self-discipline.
This change did result in evidence of a one factor structure. The second
eigenvalue was slightly above one, but only slightly (first eigenvalue=3.30; second
eigenvalue=1.01). More importantly, the scree plot showed clearly one factor before the
bend of the elbow. The first factor now accounted for 47% of the variance, and
coefficient omega jumped from 0.72 to 0.85. Factor loadings for the simplified scale of
lack of self-discipline were all large, ranging from 0.57 to 0.77. It is recommended that
researchers interested in the self-control scale be precise in the research question being
asked. For researcher specifically interested in the presence of self-control, the full scale
may be theoretically more relevant even if less internally consistent. If a more loose
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definition of self-control is acceptable, the revised seven-item scale of items reverse
scored will likely perform better. The possible changes are reiterated in Table 6.
Aim 2: Personal fulfilment inventory creation
Items selected for all subscales are presented in Appendix C. The pleasurable life
subscale was created first. In many cases, it was impossible to find items with large
correlations with all items across all four psychological constructs. Correlations between
items were generally small to moderate and not always significant, around r=0.10 to
r=0.20. There were three items with slight negative correlations, however two of the
negative correlations were close to zero, the third and largest negative correlation was r=0.08 (p=0.2340). The largest correlation was r=0.80 (p<0.0001).
Next, the good life subscale was created. This scale was a little more cooperative:
though there was one bivariate correlation at r=0.00 (p=0.9308), there were no negative
correlations. Individual correlations were still small, but closer to r=0.20. The largest
individual item correlation was smaller than on the pleasurable life subscale (r=0.54,
p<0.0001).
Lastly, the meaning subscale was created. This scale was the least compatible
between items. There were nine items with negative bivariate correlations. Seven of
these were virtually zero, however there were two that were moderately small (r=-0.13,
p=0.0422; r=-0.16, p=0.0094). Both of these items were from the FC, specifically the
fear of loss of identity subscale, to which major edits were suggested because no items
showed simple structure. For this reason, options were limited and item relationships
were not always clear. There was a range of item correlations, many fairly small, others
moderate in size, most around r=0.05 to r=0.30. The largest was r=0.76 (p<0.0001).
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Confirmatory factor analysis was performed with each of Winston’s (2016) three
developmental stages as three separate factors, and covariances between factors were
estimated. The loading for one item on each factor was fixed to one. The first model
provided an RMSEA just at standard research limits (RMSEA= 0.1002, 90% CI [0.0931,
0.1072), however the CFI was exceptionally low (CFI=0.47). A review of residuals
showed exceptionally large standardized residuals between items from the same original
scales (e.g. as large as psy(epq2, epq3)=0.76). A post hoc adjustment was made to
covary errors for items on the same scale (i.e. items on the FNSM were covaried with
other items on the FNSM; items on the OTH covaried with other items on the OTH;
items on the FC covaried with other items on the FC; items on the EPQ covaried with
other items on the EPQ; and items on the SCS covaried with other items on the SCS).
Though this may have been a risk of overfitting the model, these items should have had
correlated errors because they were from the same questionnaires. Model fit statistics are
presented in Table 7 and estimates in Table 8. This change greatly increased model fit, to
within acceptable limits (i.e., RMSEA<0.1000, CFI>0.90).
Three models were tested: a correlated model with covariances estimated between
all three factors, an orthogonal model with covariances between factors constrained to
zero, and a single factor model with covariances between factors constrained to one. The
best fitting model was the correlated model. The chi square value was significant
(X2(466, N=129)=572.4348, p=0.0005), however the CFI was now clearly within
acceptable limits (CFI=0.93), and the RMSEA was the lowest of all models
(RMSEA=0.0422, 90% CI [0.0289, 0.0536]). The orthogonal model was the worst
fitting model. Though the RMSEA was appropriate (RMSEA=0.0575, 90% CI [0.0472,
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0.0672]), the CFI was somewhat low (CFI=0.86). The chi squared value was
significantly larger than it was for the correlated model (X2(3, N=129)=94.92, p<0.0001)
and the change in CFI was significantly lower (change in CFI=0.07).
As its own model, the single factor model was not unreasonably fit. The chi
square value was significant, (X2(469, N=129)=627.36, p<0.0001), yet the CFI was close
to acceptable limits (CFI=0.89), and the RMSEA was appropriate (RMSEA=0.0514, 90%
CI [0.0402, 0.0616]). While the single factor model may have been a reasonable
standalone model, it had significantly worse metrics of fit than the correlated model
across chi squared value (X2(3, N=129)=54.93, p<0.0001), CFI (change in CFI=0.04),
and RMSEA (change in RMSEA=0.0082). Ultimately, it was the correlated model that
was favored.
Examining standardized loadings, most are significant and moderate in size,
around 0.30 to 0.40. There were two items with negative loadings, though these were
virtually zero and both insignificant (“risks to another should never be tolerated,
irrespective of how small the risks might be:” loading=-0.02, p=0.8078; and, “the
existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be
gained:” loading=-0.01, p=0.9251, both from the EPQ on the meaning subscale). Beyond
these two negative loadings, there were three other nonsignificant items (“ethical
considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should be
allowed to formulate their own individual codes:” loading=0.08, p=0.2931, from the EPQ
on the pleasure subscale; “I do things that feel good in the moment but regret later on:”
loading=0.11, p=0.2360, from the SCS on the good life subscale; and “the dignity and
welfare of the people should be the most important concern in any society:”
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loading=0.03, p=0.7421). The other items were all significant, most at p<0.0001. The
largest loading was 0.81 (p<0.0001, for “I completely accept all aspects of myself,” from
the FNSM on the meaning subscale). Internal consistency was strong for the PFI overall
(omega=0.83). Though internal consistency was less for individual subscales, it was not
unreasonably low (pleasurable life: omega=0.69; good life subscale: omega=0.75;
meaningful life subscale: omega=0.73).
The correlated errors led to inflated covariance estimates within the SEM, so
bivariate correlations between scales were seen as more interpretable. Correlations
between subscales were moderate to large and all significant (pleasure and engagement:
r=0.40, p<0.0001; pleasure and meaning: r=0.34, p<0.0001; engagement and meaning:
r=0.56, p<0.0001). Additionally, seeing as Winston’s (2016) model is developmental in
theoretical organization, correlations were also examined between age and scales of the
PFI. Contrary to expectations, correlations were very small and all insignificant
(pleasure: r=-0.05, p=0.4636; engagement: r=-0.01, p=0.8518; meaning: r=0.02,
p=0.7533). The low correlations could have been due to a somewhat restricted age range
in the current sample; this could be tested further in a sample with a more diverse age
range.
Lastly, to verify functionality of the scale, multiple regression was used to predict
overall life satisfaction as measured by the SWLS. Hierarchical multiple regression was
used in three steps, starting with pleasure and adding engagement and then meaning.
Results can be found in Table 9. The model only including pleasure was significant (F(1,
115)=26.2, p<0.0001) and accounted for a moderate amount of the variance (adjusted
R2=0.18). The relationship between pleasure and satisfaction was significant (β=-0.43,
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p<0.0001), however in the opposite direction as was expected. There was a moderately
large negative relationship between pleasure and satisfaction. Adding engagement, the
model was still significant (F(2, 114)=27.9, p<0.0001), now explaining a large amount of
variance (adjusted R2=0.32). Both parameters were significant (pleasure: p=0.0018;
engagement: p<0.0001). As before, coefficients were negative, engagement predicting
less satisfaction than pleasure (pleasure: β=-0.27; engagement: β=-0.41). Lastly,
meaning was added. The model was virtually unchanged, remaining significant (F(3,
113)=19.02, p<0.0001) with no change to the amount of variance explained (R2=0.32).
Parameter estimates for pleasure and engagement shrank slightly, however they were still
significant and close to what they previously were (pleasure: β=-0.25, p=0.0037;
engagement: β=-0.36, p=0.0003). The standardized coefficient for meaning was small
and nonsignificant (β=-0.10, p=0.283), the unstandardized coefficient only slightly larger
than its standard error (B=-0.23, SE=0.22). Though this provides some evidence in
support of the scale’s functionality, the negative coefficients were unexpected and should
be examined in further research.
Discussion
The first aim of this analysis was to provide improved metrics for measuring
psychological constructs of happiness and development within undergraduate students.
Specific scale items and possible edits are reviewed in Table 2 through Table 6. Most
scales were reasonable functional. Though items may be considered for removal to
improve discriminatory functioning, most scales were appropriate. The FNSM is quite
long, clearly unparsimonious and lacking clear factor definition. Though no edits were
suggested, tailoring the scale to individual research projects may be worth consideration.
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There was some concern that individual subscales of the OTH did not function as
expected, suggested edits more or less cleaned up the item ambiguities. The FC was the
most concerning scale. As an overall metric of existential fear, the scale was fine. That
said, when trying to distinguish individual sources of fear, the scale broke down,
especially the fear of loss of identity subscale. The EPQ was the most stable scale.
Individual items acted counter to expectations and are suggested to be removed (i.e.
“Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should
be allowed to formulate their own individual codes,” and “Whether a lie is judged to be
moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action,” from the
relativism subscale; and “People should make certain that their actions never
intentionally harm another even to a small degree,” and “It is never necessary to sacrifice
the welfare of others,” from the idealism subscale), however the scale as a whole showed
strong internal consistency. The SCS was of concern. The full scale was reasonably
functional, though there was a functional difference between items that measured selfcontrol and items that were reverse scored to measure a lack of self-control. Removing
the not-reverse-scored items improved internal consistency of the scale, however this
change does change the scale from measuring self-control from multiple angles to
measuring specifically a lack of self-control.
The second aim of this analysis was to compile the PFI, a summary scale
organized from reviewed questionnaires to measure a broader conception of happiness
that transcends and summarizes psychological development. The theoretical foundations
for the scale come from Winston (2016), and the scale was intended to measure
psychological development along the lines of her theory. The items on the scale were
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drawn from existing scales and are provided in Table 7. In terms of the basics,
development of this scale was successful. The model fit the data well enough and
internal consistency for the scale was appropriate. Some of the subscales had lower
internal consistency lower than would have been ideal, however no value was
unreasonably small. What was more concerning was the functionality of the scale in
context. The theory was inherently developmental by design, yet correlations with age
were generally small. A more age-diverse or longitudinal sample would allow a clearer
assessment of a developmental aspect.
Specifically, this lack of relationship with age may be because it was assessed
within an undergraduate sample. Winston’s (2016) theory is developmental, but at the
scale of lifespan development. Although the oldest participant was 55 years old, most
participants were in their late teens and early 20s. What small correlations could be
identified with age were in the directions Winston (2016) would predict. There was a
negative relationship with pleasure, meaning that pleasure marginally decreased with age.
The weakest relationship was between age and engagement, the middle stage of
development. Lastly, there was a positive relationship between age and meaning,
meaning that older students experienced happiness as meaning marginally more than
younger students.
One possible explanation for these unexpectedly small relationships is that the
mechanical driver of development within Winston’s (2016) theory is not age, but rather
experience. Correlations with the number of years postsecondary education were still
small and insignificant, but slightly larger than the correlations with age. The same
pattern of results was also identified (i.e., negative correlation with pleasure, positive
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correlation with meaning, correlation with engagement between the correlations for
pleasure and meaning). This may provide some evidence in support of Winston’s (2016)
ordering, although further investigation of this is certainly warranted.
The other unexpected result was the relationships between the PFI and life
satisfaction. Winston’s (2016) theory implies that happiness as meaning is the most
satisfying, followed by engagement, and pleasure the least satisfying. This was in some
ways confirmed, although not as expected. Rather than participants high in meaning
being high in satisfaction, it was the opposite. Participants high in pleasure were low in
satisfaction, while there was no significant relationship between meaning and
satisfaction. One possible explanation for this is the overall satisfaction among
participants. In general, participants reported being quite low in life satisfaction,
suggesting that this specific sample may have been particularly unsatisfied in general. It
would be stronger evidence in support of Winston’s (2016) theory if there were a strong
positive relationship between meaning and satisfaction; a weaker relationship between
engagement and satisfaction; and the weakest between pleasure and meaning. Meaning
being uncorrelated with an unsatisfied sample, and pleasure predicting lack of satisfaction
in the same sample is some evidence in support of Winston’s (2016) theory.
Though the overall trend that pleasure is the least satisfying and meaning is the
most satisfying was evident in the data, it was unexpected that engagement would be the
strongest predictor of dissatisfaction in the sample, counter to Winston’s (2016) theory.
This may be because happiness as engagement as a phenomenon is often at odds with
how happiness is often conceptualized. Engagement is the active process of getting lost
in an activity, it is defined by being in the moment. Though experiencing engagement
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may feel euphoric, it begins and ends at the moment of engagement. It is possible that
this experience is not measured by questionnaires as easily as pleasure or meaning
because it is such an active process to experience engagement.
Another possible explanation is that this is an error not of measurement but of
theory by Winston (2016). A running consideration through the entire analysis is the
confounding between scale imperfections and theoretical imperfections by Winston
(2016). Winston’s (2016) theory was entirely rational in epistemology, therefor the
empirical validity of her theory is yet undetermined. At the crux of this dilemma is the
naturalistic fallacy: that which is observed is not necessarily that which should be
observed (Lapsley, 1996). The PFI was specifically tailored to quantify the theories
Winston (2016) describes. It identifies what should be observed according to Winston
(2016), which was the goal of creating the scale. The question remains as to what will be
observed, whether or not her theory is an accurate representation of development.
For example, suppose that the small correlation with age is taken as a true null
relationship with age and the PFI is accepted as an appropriate quantification of her
theory. If this is the case, then this lack of correlation with age would indicate that her
theory should not be considered developmental. However, at this point, it is uncertain
whether or not the PFI can be accepted as a true quantification of Winston’s (2016)
theory, and the true relationship with age is also undetermined. The goal of this analysis
was to identify meaningful question items to quantify her theory. In assessing how well
this goal was accomplished, it is unclear whether results counter to expectations are due
to errors of the scale or empirical errors of the theory.
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This complication directly extends into the issue of insignificant items, especially
from the EPQ. All EPQ items on the meaning subscale were insignificant, two loadings
even slightly negative. A fourth EPQ item was also insignificant on the pleasure
subscale. This could easily be a taken as a criticism of the EPQ being irrelevant. This is
not the opinion of the researcher. The EPQ had strong metrics of internal consistency
and simple structure among item loadings; it was characterized as the most stable of all
scales considered. Moreover, there was one item that was not on the EPQ that was
insignificant, from the SCS on the engagement subscale. Rather than blaming the EPQ as
an inappropriate scale, an alternative interpretation is that it was Kohlberg’s (1984)
theory, measured by both scales, that was less related to the other theories Winston
(2016) discusses.
There is theoretical and empirical support for this interpretation. Firstly,
Winston’s (2016) argument only draws in Kohlberg’s (1984) theory at the end of her
analysis. The majority of the theory focuses on Maslow’s (1987), Seligman’s (2002), and
Kierkegaard’s (1989) theories as the fundamental underpinnings. Kohlberg’s (1984)
theory is identified toward the end of the analysis to expand the theory from exclusively
affective to ontological. It is argued that these affective transitions are the foundations
for a broader sense of perspective. Within Winston’s (2016) writing, Kohlberg’s (1984)
theory is not identified as a central factor, but rather a further extension of the theory.
Small and insignificant loadings could have been expected because it is at the fringe of
Winston’s writing.
It is not only in theory from Winston (2016) that this result can be expected, but it
is also predictable given original theory from Kohlberg (1984). The full theory of moral
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development Kohlberg (1984) discusses can be expanded into seven stages: two stages
for preconventional morality, two stages for conventional morality, two stages for
postconventional or principled morality, and one stage of existential pondering. The
method for developing the theory relied on quantitative hermeneutics (Kohlberg, 1984;
Lapsley, 1996). The linguistic details of how morality was discussed was a central focus
in developing the theory.
In distinguishing among the later stages of his theory, a particular focus was
placed on distinguishing between stages five and six of principled morality. Stage five
morality was characterized as being discussed with the formalities of logic and social
contracts, like how John Rawls discusses justice in A Theory of Justice (1971). Stage six
morality is realized when the formalities of language are lost. Actions are judged good
and bad with simplicity and certainty rather than formal logic. This is important because
the EPQ is at times wordy and formal. Low, or even negative, factor loadings would be
expected among the most morally developed for complex questions as were on the EPQ.
All in all, these provide some evidence in support of Winston’s (2016) theory, even if not
the supporting evidence that was expected to have been identified.
Limitations and future directions
The largest limitation to this analysis was the age of the sample. Winston’s
(2016) theory was intended as a lifelong developmental theory, yet the sample was
predominantly made up of individuals who were in their twenties. Future researchers
may want to sample a wider range of ages. Beyond different ages, a stronger analysis of
Winston’s (2016) theory would be longitudinal. It is predicted that stages develop in a
specific order, which was fundamentally untestable within this sample. A cross lagged
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panel design would be more apt to examine the specific orderings of stages within
Winston’s (2016) theory.
Another limitation was the sample itself. Participants provided low values for
overall life satisfaction, the implications of which are unclear. If this is taken as a true
representation of dissatisfaction within the sample, then the sample may not generalize to
other samples of more satisfied participants. If this is taken as an effect of bias in
response behavior, then the validity of the factor analyses are uncertain. Though it is
unclear what specific ways this impacts interpretation of results, it is certainly a limitation
that the sample was so unsatisfied. One remedy would be to resample and attempt to
replicate in a future study.
Another limitation is the sample size. Though factor analysis can be performed
on as few as 50 participants (Stevens, 1996), a larger sample is preferred, according to
Harlow (2014) as large as 200 if not more. The samples here were both larger than 100
which should have been sufficient, however a larger sample would be more reliable.
Again, future research should validate these results with larger samples.
Beyond replication, researchers interested in the PFI may also want to consider
the ways that scores on the PFI were calculated. Responses were solicited in a variety of
ways (i.e. as a Likert scale from 1 to 5; a Likert scale from 1 to 9; as a dichotomous yes
or no), a limitation. Furthermore, to account for these different response formats,
responses were transformed into percentages, points scored out of points possible (see
Appendix B and Appendix C). Though these transformations allow for standardized
arithmetic integrating scale responses, it is not standard practice to score questionnaires
in this way. Additive and multiplicative transformation are not generally viewed as a risk
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to the underlying data distribution (Myers, Well, & Lorch, 2010), although response
patterns are likely different across question response formats. Future researchers should
consider simplifying and standardizing item response formats.
Outside of statistical limitations within the sample, the theoretical implications are
limited to the sample. The sample predominantly identified as white, cisgender, and
female, and the data were collected at a New England university. It is well documented
that these populations are oversampled, and in many cases do not generalize to other
populations (Matsumoto & van de Vijver, 2010). This is especially a concern because
the theories in this analysis are all from white researchers of European descent. Though
efforts have been made to cross culturally validate individual theories (Avsec, Kavčič, &
Jarden, 2016; Gilligan, 1993; Kohlberg, 1984; Lapsley, 1996; Neher, 1991), the whole
analysis can be criticized as Eurocentric at the foundation. Future research should
examine cross cultural implications and differences.
Conclusion
The goal of this analysis was to refine metrics for measuring deeper metrics of
psychological development among fields that are not always empirical. Though there
remain concerns about the functionality of individual scales, all scales were quantitatively
improved as a result of this analysis. Assessing generalizability and tailoring scales to
different populations is certainly warranted, this analysis has provided preliminary
evidence as to how these scales function. This analysis sought to create a composite
scale in the PFI, and the PFI was created with reasonable internal consistency. Whereas
future researchers may want to further examine the empirical validity of Winston’s
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(2016) theory, this analysis has provided some preliminary results in support of the
theory.
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Table 1.
Descriptive statistics
Variable

Mean

SD Min Max Skew

Kurt

Unedited
Omega

Edited
Omega

55.0
0

6.89

59.77

3.57

0.52 2.14 4.99

-0.11

0.44

0.97

Physiological needs

3.41

0.63 1.80 5.00

-0.06

-0.10

0.88

Safety security needs

3.75

0.58 2.40 5.00

0.08

-0.30

0.89

Belongingness needs

3.75

0.58 2.40 5.00

0.08

-0.30

0.92

Esteem needs

3.60

0.68 1.00 5.00

-0.71

1.08

0.95

Self-actualization needs

3.20

0.80 1.17 5.00

-0.14

-0.21

0.94

8.11

3.93 0.00

18.0
0

0.03

-0.34

0.82

0.82

Control

1.57

1.83 0.00 6.00

0.87

-0.48

0.72

0.74

Social relations

3.53

1.75 0.00 6.00

-0.51

-0.68

0.81

0.82

Identity

3.00

1.58 0.00 6.00

-0.16

-0.50

0.59

0.63

3.53

0.45 1.06 5.00

-0.48

3.43

0.81

0.78

Pleasure

3.64

0.58 1.17 5.00

-0.83

2.48

0.73

0.73

Engagement

3.27

0.55 1.00 5.00

-0.02

1.05

0.70

0.72

Meaning

3.69

0.61 1.00 5.00

-0.63

1.67

0.78

0.79

6.22

1.08 2.85 9.00

-0.07

0.36

0.88

0.88

Relativism

5.80

1.26 1.00 9.00

-0.01

1.03

0.89

0.89

Idealism

6.63

1.38 2.20 9.00

-0.62

-0.02

0.86

0.89

Self-control scale

3.22

0.70 1.50 5.00

-0.31

-0.24

0.72

0.85

Personal fulfillment inventory

2.30

0.50 1.76 4.00

-0.16

0.30

0.83

Pleasure

2.19

0.59 0.63 4.00

0.23

-0.38

0.69

Engagement

2.48

0.62 1.50 4.00

-0.63

0.21

0.75

Meaning

2.23

0.61 1.42 4.00

0.01

-0.03

0.73

3.23

1.39 1.00 7.00

0.70

-0.05

0.93

Age

20.08

Five needs satisfaction measure

Fear checklist

Orientations toward happiness

Ethical position questionnaire

Satisfaction with life scale

3.30 18.00
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Table 2.
Five needs satisfaction measure items and loadings
Subscales only

All items

Factor

Factor

1

1

2

3

4

5

1. The quality of the food I eat every day

0.74

0.11

-0.12

0.56

0.22

0.15

2. The amount of food that I eat every day

0.69

0.03

0.10

0.55

0.13

0.09

3. The quality of the water I drink every day

0.53

-0.13

-0.24

0.65

0.17

0.13

4. The amount of water that I drink every day

0.65

0.11

-0.02

0.60

0.05

-0.02

5. The amount of heating I have when the weather is cold

0.43

0.02

0.04

0.29

0.42

-0.13

6. The amount of cooling I have when the weather is hot

0.42

0.03

-0.10

0.18

0.51

0.14

7. The quality of the air I breathe every day

0.29

-0.09

0.01

0.05

0.63

0.20

8. The amount of sex I am having

0.34

-0.07

0.08

-0.01

0.05

0.66

9. The quality of sex I am having

0.38

-0.12

0.09

0.11

0.02

0.75

10. Every aspect of my physical health

0.79

0.45

-0.12

0.54

-0.05

0.12

11. The amount of sleep I get to feel thoroughly relaxed

0.71

0.31

-0.07

0.53

-0.07

0.13

12. The quality of sleep I get to feel fully refreshed

0.77

0.36

-0.09

0.61

-0.05

0.01

13. The amount of exercise I get to keep me healthy

0.80

0.23

-0.02

0.65

-0.16

0.12

14. The type of exercise I get to keep my body toned

0.75

0.23

-0.05

0.59

-0.13

0.15

15. My overall physical strength

0.69

0.12

0.01

0.67

-0.25

0.10

1. The quality of the house/apartment I am living in

0.50

0.24

-0.28

0.18

0.53

0.08

2. The space available for me in my house/apartment

0.45

0.08

-0.18

0.35

0.31

0.11

3. How secure I am in my house/apartment

0.43

0.31

-0.04

-0.07

0.50

0.03

4. How safe I am from being physically attacked

0.61

-0.03

0.03

-0.06

0.71

-0.04

5. The safety of my neighborhood

0.54

0.07

-0.12

-0.20

0.80

0.14

6. How safe I am from catching any diseases

0.61

0.35

-0.04

-0.13

0.68

0.10

7. How secure I am from disasters

0.79

-0.01

0.18

0.08

0.71

-0.09

Physiological needs

Safety–security needs

49

8. How protected I am from dangers in the environment

0.78

0.00

0.19

0.08

0.68

-0.04

9. The protection that the police provide for me

0.77

-0.09

0.19

0.29

0.55

-0.15

10. The protection that the law provides for me

0.70

-0.30

0.27

0.53

0.25

0.00

11. How safe I am from destructive terrorist acts

0.67

-0.22

0.07

0.51

0.34

0.00

12. How safe I am from acts of war

0.57

-0.40

0.16

0.28

0.42

0.04

13. My financial security

0.68

0.00

0.18

0.74

0.11

-0.23

14. My ability to get money whenever I need it

0.67

0.01

0.25

0.67

0.08

-0.29

15. The money I reserved for me to have a secure retirement

0.54

0.04

-0.05

0.71

0.04

-0.12

1. The amount of rapport I share with the people I know

0.64

-0.09

0.60

0.20

-0.03

0.02

2. The quality of the relationships I have with my friends

0.78

-0.01

0.75

0.11

-0.04

-0.11

3. The love I receive from my spouse/partner

0.32

-0.12

0.02

0.05

0.02

0.84

4. The intimacy I share with my immediate family

0.67

0.17

0.35

0.18

0.12

0.23

5. The camaraderie I share with my colleagues

0.73

0.02

0.67

-0.06

0.15

0.05

6. How much I am welcomed in my community

0.76

0.11

0.67

-0.05

0.12

-0.02

7. The warmth I share with my relatives

0.74

-0.10

0.56

0.29

0.02

0.22

8. The emotional support I receive from my friends

0.73

0.03

0.80

-0.07 -0.10

-0.12

9. The feeling of togetherness I have with my family

0.73

0.11

0.44

0.33

-0.01

0.22

10. How much I am cared for by my spouse/partner

0.35

-0.04

-0.01

0.00

0.11

0.84

11. The happiness I share with my companions

0.81

0.00

0.62

-0.01

0.09

0.30

12. The sympathy I receive from my confidants

0.78

-0.03

0.79

0.00

-0.06

0.02

13. The enjoyment I share with associates

0.68

0.15

0.59

-0.09

0.24

-0.14

14. The affection shown to me by my friends

0.72

0.06

0.81

-0.12

0.07

-0.25

15. The closeness I feel with my associates

0.75

0.09

0.72

0.02

0.06

-0.14

1. The admiration given to me by others

0.75

0.15

0.73

-0.12 -0.10

0.12

2. The honor that many people give me

0.75

0.09

0.76

-0.06 -0.10

0.09

3. How much other people respect me as a person

0.71

0.18

0.67

-0.07 -0.07

0.00

Belongingness needs

Esteem Needs
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4. The prestige I have in the eyes of other people

0.69

-0.01

0.56

0.20

-0.08

0.24

5. How highly other people think of me

0.76

0.22

0.54

-0.07

0.02

0.14

6. The high esteem that other people have for me

0.80

0.31

0.55

0.02

-0.16

0.12

7. The recognition I receive from various people

0.77

0.27

0.46

-0.04

0.14

0.21

8. The high regard that other people have for me

0.78

0.28

0.44

-0.05

0.07

0.22

9. How much I like the person that I am

0.81

0.67

0.17

-0.06

0.10

0.13

10. How sure I am of myself

0.81

0.67

0.24

-0.17

0.17

0.02

11. How much respect I have for myself

0.81

0.72

0.23

-0.09 -0.03

0.03

12. All the good qualities I have as a person

0.71

0.64

0.14

-0.12 -0.05

0.07

13. My sense of self-worth

0.79

0.68

0.14

-0.10

0.06

0.14

14. The amount of esteem I have for myself

0.79

0.76

0.03

0.03

-0.04

0.13

15. How positive I feel about myself as a person

0.81

0.78

0.04

-0.04

0.12

0.11

1. I am totally comfortable with all facets of my personality.

0.76

0.65

0.17

0.14

-0.19

0.03

2. I feel that I am completely self-fulfilled.

0.77

0.69

0.16

0.07

-0.24

-0.05

3. I am now being the person I always wanted to be.

0.82

0.79

-0.08

0.16

-0.01

-0.04

4. I am finally realizing all of my innermost desires.

0.69

0.64

0.08

0.05

0.04

-0.21

5. I indulge myself as much as I want.

0.56

0.46

0.16

0.05

-0.01

-0.27

6. I am now enjoying everything I ever wanted from my life.

0.83

0.79

-0.02

0.09

0.00

-0.23

7. I completely accept all aspects of myself.

0.80

0.76

0.07

0.04

0.00

0.02

8. My actions are always according to my own values.

0.63

0.64

-0.04

-0.04

0.30

-0.13

9. I am living my life the way I want.

0.86

0.81

-0.04

0.14

0.14

-0.13

10. I do the things I like to do whenever I want.

0.75

0.62

0.00

0.22

0.12

-0.10

11. I am actually living up to all my capabilities.

0.83

0.75

-0.02

0.17

-0.04

-0.17

12. I am living my life to the fullest.

0.85

0.70

0.03

0.22

0.03

-0.04

Self-actualization needs

Note: multiple factor analyses were run. The left most column represents five factor
analyses, when each subscale was performed without including other subscale items with
a single-factor solution. The column second from the left represents a one-factor solution
with all items included, rather than individual subscales isolated in the analysis. Lastly,
the five columns on the right represent a five-factor solution with a promax rotation with
all items included. The values 1 through 5 column headers represent the factor onto
which items are loading. On the left, there were only single-factor solutions, so there
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was only one factor onto which items could load. On the right, there was a five-factor
solution, so the column headers distinguish the factor onto which items were loading.
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Table 3.
Orientations toward happiness questionnaire items and loadings
Subscales only

All items

Factor
1
Pleasure
3. Life is too short to postpone
the pleasures it can provide.
8. I go out of my way to feel
euphoric.
13. In choosing what to do, I
always take into account whether
it will be pleasurable.
15. I agree with this statement:
‘‘Life is short – eat dessert
first.’’
16. I love to do things that excite
my senses.
18. For me, the good life is the
pleasurable life.
Engagement
1. Regardless of what I am
doing, time passes very quickly.
4. I seek out situations that
challenge my skills and abilities.
6. Whether at work or play, I am
usually ‘‘in a zone’’ and not
conscious of myself.
7. I am always very absorbed in
what I do.
9. In choosing what to do, I
always take into account whether
I can lose myself in it.
10. I am rarely distracted by
what is going on around me.
Meaning
2. My life serves a higher
purpose.

1

Factor
1

2

3

1

2

3

0.62 0.62 0.08 0.54 0.10 0.56 0.09 0.09
0.45

-0.11 0.36 0.41

0.73 0.71 -0.02 0.67 0.15 0.67 0.09 0.04

0.63 0.64 0.11 0.55 0.02 0.55 -0.01 0.18
0.67 0.71 -0.12 0.78 -0.08 0.79 -0.07 -0.13
0.75 0.78 0.13 0.72 -0.06 0.74 -0.06 0.11

0.38

0.22 0.24 0.30

0.65 0.64 0.05 -0.13 0.63 -0.13 0.66 0.04

0.71 0.71 -0.18 0.22 0.69 0.21 0.72 -0.20
0.71 0.70 -0.02 0.10 0.69 0.14 0.72 -0.08

0.66 0.68 0.08 0.06 0.59 0.08 0.62 0.05
0.64 0.67 0.12 -0.29 0.64 -0.29 0.65 0.18

0.67 0.71 0.57 -0.04 0.37 0.00 0.32 0.59
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5. In choosing what to do, I
always take into account whether
it will benefit other people.
0.60
0.51 0.05 0.19
11. I have a responsibility to
make the world a better place.
0.78 0.77 0.79 0.08 -0.15 0.15 -0.12 0.75
12. My life has a lasting
meaning.
0.87 0.88 0.79 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.80
14. What I do matters to society. 0.65 0.72 0.75 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.12 0.81
17. I have spent a lot of time
thinking about what life means
and how I fit into its big picture. 0.48
0.40 0.36 -0.28
Note: multiple factor analyses were run. The two left most columns represents three
factor analyses performed twice. Each subscale was performed without including other
subscale items with a single-factor solution in the left most column. After additional
subscale items were removed, the analysis was rerun the column second from the left.
The third and fourth columns represent a one factor solution with all items included. The
third column include all item loadings for all question items, while the fourth column
includes item loading after some questions were removed. Lastly, the six columns on the
right represent a three-factor solution with a promax rotation with all items included
done twice, first will all items included and then with some items removed. The values 1
through 3 column headers represent the factor onto which items are loading. On the left,
there were only single-factor solutions, so there was only one factor onto which items
could load. On the right, there were three-factor solutions, so the column headers
distinguish the factor onto which items were loading.
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Table 4.
Fear checklist items and loadings
Subscales only

All items

Factor
1

1

Factor
1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

Fear of loss of control
7. Control

0.30

0.01 0.17 0.51

8. Powerlessness

0.70

0.71 0.63 0.22 -0.32 0.78 0.01 -0.24 -0.02 0.82 -0.15

9. Inadequacy

0.77

0.78 0.68 0.15 -0.06 0.75 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.81 -0.04

10. Rejection

0.61

0.62 0.66 -0.12 0.16 0.45 -0.01 0.45

11. Weakness

0.78

0.77 0.71 0.05 0.24 0.60 0.12 0.28 -0.04 0.55 0.45

12. Vulnerability

0.61

0.61 0.41 0.23 0.04 0.53 0.18 -0.17 0.12 0.40 0.40

1. Intimacy

0.78

0.79 0.06 0.78 -0.04 0.06 0.77 -0.04 0.79 0.02 -0.01

2. Honesty

0.45

3. Dating

0.77

0.78 0.10 0.71 0.05 0.03 0.75 0.10 0.77 0.07 -0.08

4. Social relations

0.69

0.69 0.06 0.58 0.21 -0.08 0.71 0.25 0.65 -0.04 0.18

5. Closeness

0.80

0.81 -0.05 0.81 0.04 0.00 0.80 -0.12 0.79 0.00 -0.05

6. Commitment

0.74

0.74 -0.08 0.75 0.09 -0.03 0.75 -0.11 0.76 -0.06 -0.02

13. Failure

0.66

0.66 0.56 -0.14 0.16 0.45 -0.06 0.29 -0.10 0.11 0.70

14. Disapproval

0.83

0.83 0.78 -0.07 -0.10 0.72 -0.13 0.18

15. Insignificance

0.75

0.75 0.72 0.05 -0.13 0.73 -0.04 0.06

16. Other people’s opinions

0.44

0.44 0.36 -0.30 0.51 -0.10 0.05 0.88 0.03 -0.24 0.79

17. Success

-0.01

18. Anonymity

0.34

Fear of loss of social relations

-0.06 0.17 0.65

Fear of loss of identity

-0.16 0.10 0.73
0.34 0.25 0.21 0.38 0.17 0.36 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.26

Note: multiple factor analyses were run. The two left most columns represents three
factor analyses performed twice. Each subscale was performed without including other
subscale items with a single-factor solution in the left most column. After additional
subscale items were removed, the analysis was rerun the column second from the left.
The third and fourth columns represent a one factor solution with all items included. The
third column include all item loadings for all question items, while the fourth column
includes item loading after some questions were removed. Lastly, the nine columns on
the right represent a three-factor solution with a promax rotation with all items included
performed three times, first will all items included and then with increasingly many items
removed. The values 1 through 3 column headers represent the factor onto which items
are loading. On the left, there were only single-factor solutions, so there was only one
factor onto which items could load. On the right, there were three-factor solutions, so
the column headers distinguish the factor onto which items were loading.
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Table 5.
Ethics position questionnaire items and loadings
Subscales only

All items

Factor
1
Moral relativism
11. There are no ethical principles that are so
important that they should be a part of any
code of ethics.
12. What is ethical varies from one situation
and society to another.
13. Moral standards should be seen as being
individualistic; what one person considers to
be moral may be judged to be immoral by
another person.
14. Different types of morality cannot be
compared as to “rightness.”
15. Questions of what is ethical for everyone
can never be resolved since what is moral or
immoral is up to the individual.
16. Moral standards are simply personal
rules that indicate how a person should
behave, and are not to be applied in making
judgments of others.
17. Ethical considerations in interpersonal
relations are so complex that individuals
should be allowed to formulate their own
individual codes.
18. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that
prevents certain types of actions could stand
in the way of better human relations and
adjustment.
19. No rule concerning lying can be
formulated; whether a lie is permissible or
not permissible totally depends upon the
situation.
20. Whether a lie is judged to be moral or
immoral depends upon the circumstances
surrounding the action.
Moral idealism
1. People should make certain that their
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1

Factor
1

2

1

2

0.69 0.69 0.05 0.68 0.68 0.04
0.76 0.77 -0.02 0.77 0.78 -0.02

0.86 0.87 -0.06 0.88 0.89 -0.06
0.77 0.79 -0.02 0.79 0.79 0.00

0.83 0.84 0.00 0.84 0.83 0.02

0.80 0.81 -0.03 0.81 0.81 -0.02

0.22

0.24 0.13

0.64 0.62 0.08 0.61 0.60 0.06

0.60 0.58 0.13 0.55 0.56 0.08

0.29

0.33 0.17

0.50

0.56 -0.09

actions never intentionally harm another
even to a small degree.
2. Risks to another should never be tolerated,
irrespective of how small the risks might be. 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.00 -0.01 0.75
3. The existence of potential harm to others
is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits
to be gained.
0.72 0.74 0.72 0.03 0.00 0.74
4. One should never psychologically or
physically harm another person.
0.70 0.72 0.66 0.11 0.09 0.70
5. One should not perform an action which
might in any way threaten the dignity and
welfare of another individual.
0.85 0.87 0.85 -0.07 -0.09 0.90
6. If an action could harm an innocent other,
then it should not be done.
0.76 0.77 0.76 0.02 0.01 0.77
7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act
by balancing the positive consequences of
the act against the negative consequences of
the act is immoral.
0.78 0.82 0.76 0.04 0.01 0.81
8. The dignity and welfare of the people
should be the most important concern in any
society.
0.74 0.73 0.71 0.10 0.10 0.70
9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the
welfare of others.
0.53
0.56 -0.10
10. Moral behaviors are actions that closely
match ideals of the most “perfect” action.
0.63 0.60 0.63 -0.02 -0.01 0.60
Note: multiple factor analyses were run. The two left most columns represents two factor
analyses performed twice. Each subscale was performed without including other
subscale items with a single-factor solution in the left most column. After additional
subscale items were removed, the analysis was rerun the column second from the left.
The third and fourth columns represent a one factor solution with all items included. The
third column include all item loadings for all question items, while the fourth column
includes item loading after some questions were removed. Lastly, the four columns on
the right represent a two-factor solution with a promax rotation with all items included
done twice, first will all items included and then with some items removed. The values 1
and 2 column headers represent the factor onto which items are loading. On the left,
there were only single-factor solutions, so there was only one factor onto which items
could load. On the right, there were two-factor solutions, so the column headers
distinguish the factor onto which items were loading.
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Table 6.
Self-control scale items and loadings
1

Factor
1

1

1. I have a hard time breaking bad habits.*
0.59
0.61
0.61
2. I get distracted easily.*
0.57
0.57
0.57
3. I say inappropriate things.*
0.52
0.54
0.59
4. I refuse things that are bad for me, even if they are fun.
0.35
5. I’m good at resisting temptation.
0.57
0.52
6. People would say that I have very strong self-discipline. 0.57
0.53
7. Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work
done.*
0.61
0.62
0.66
8. I do things that feel good in the moment but regret later
on.*
0.79
0.79
0.77
9. Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something,
even if I know it is wrong.*
0.77
0.79
0.82
10. I often act without thinking through all the
alternatives.*
0.69
0.71
0.74
*Item is reverse scored
Note: three factor analyses were run, each with a single-factor solution. Each column
represents a different factor analysis with increasingly many items removed.
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Table 7.
Confirmatory factor analysis model fit
Model

df

X2

RMSEA
RMSEA
CFI RMSEA 90%CI LL 90%CI UL Δ df

Δ X2

Δ CFI Δ RMSEA

3

466

572.43* 0.93

0.0422

0.0289

0.0536

2

469 627.36** 0.89

0.0514

0.0402

0.0616

3

54.93** 0.04*

0.0082

1

469 667.35** 0.86

0.0575

0.0472

0.0672

3

94.92** 0.07*

0.0153

Note: Model 1 is a correlated model where factor covariances are freely estimated;
model 2 is a one factor model where factor covariances are constrained to one; and
model 3 an orthogonal model where factor covariances are constrained to zero.
*p<0.05
**p<0.0001
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Table 8.
Personal fulfilment inventory items and loadings
Standardized loading SE

Z

p

Pleasurable life:
The quality of sleep I get to feel fully refreshed

0.30 0.09 3.19

0.0014

My financial security

0.36 0.09 3.97 <0.0001

My ability to get money whenever I need it

0.25 0.10 2.57

In choosing what to do, I always take into account whether it will be
pleasurable**

0.40 0.09 4.60 <0.0001

I love to do things that excite my senses

0.33 0.09 3.70

For me, the good life is the pleasurable life

0.40 0.09 4.58 <0.0001

Powerlessness

0.35 0.09 4.01 <0.0001

Inadequacy

0.32 0.09 3.67

0.0002

Weakness

0.22 0.09 2.44

0.0148

Moral standards are simply personal rules that indicate how a person
should behave, and are not be be applied in making judgments of others

0.30 0.08 3.71

0.0002

Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that
individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes

0.08 0.08 1.05

0.2931

Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of
actions could stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment

0.07 0.03 2.41

0.0161

0.0100

0.0002

Good life:
The quality of the relationships I have with my friends

0.37 0.09 4.16 <0.0001

How highly other people think of me

0.50 0.08 6.18 <0.0001

My sense of self-worth

0.52 0.08 6.56 <0.0001

Whether at work or play, I am usually ‘‘in a zone’’ and not conscious of
myself**

0.47 0.08 6.05 <0.0001

I am always very absorbed in what I do

0.28 0.09 3.12

I am rarely distracted by what is going on around me

0.46 0.08 5.78 <0.0001

Intimacy

0.30 0.09 3.43

Social relations

0.40 0.08 4.88 <0.0001

Closeness

0.38 0.08 4.59 <0.0001

I have a hard time breaking bad habits*

0.41 0.08 5.02 <0.0001

I get distracted easily*

0.21 0.09 2.35

0.0185

I do things that feel good in the moment but regret later on*

0.11 0.09 1.19

0.2360

0.0018
0.0006

Meaningful life:
I am totally comfortable with all facets of my personality

0.68 0.07 9.72 <0.0001

I am finally realizing all of my innermost desires

0.69 0.07 9.74 <0.0001

I completely accept all aspects of myself**

0.81 0.06 14.23 <0.0001

My life serves a higher purpose

0.32 0.09 3.63

My life has a lasting meaning

0.51 0.07 6.82 <0.0001

What I do matters to society

0.43 0.08 5.27 <0.0001

60

0.0003

Failure

0.38 0.08 4.49 <0.0001

Disapproval

0.34 0.09 3.98 <0.0001

Other people’s opinions

0.42 0.08 5.09 <0.0001

Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the
risks might be
-0.02 0.10 -0.24 0.8078
The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective
of the benefits to be gained

-0.01 0.10 -0.09 0.9251

The dignity and welfare of the people should be the most important
concern in any society

0.03 0.09 0.33

*Item is reverse scored
**Item loading was constrained to one
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0.7421

Table 9.
Multiple regression analysis of Winston’s (2016) theory predicting life satisfaction
Model

df

F

p

Adjusted R²

Predictor

B

SE

β

p

1

1, 115

26.2 <.0001

0.1785 Pleasure

-1.05 0.21 -0.43 <.0001

2

2, 114

27.9

0.3169 Pleasure

-0.65 0.20 -0.27

0.0018

Engagement -1.03 0.21 -0.41 <.0001
3

3, 113

19.02 <.0001

0.3179 Pleasure

-0.61 0.21 -0.25

0.0037

Engagement -0.90 0.24 -0.36

0.0003

Meaning

0.2830
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-0.23 0.22 -0.10

Figure 1.
Conceptual diagram from Winston’s (2016)
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Figure 2.
Matrix of developmental stages and psychological constructs
Developmental theories

The
pleasurable
life

Winston's
development The good life
al stages

Maslow's hierarchy
of needs

Seligman's
authentic
happiness

Kierkegaard's
existential
Kohlberg's moral
despair
development

Physiological and
safety-security
needs

Pleasure

Despair to not Preconventional
have a self
morality

Belongingness and
esteem needs

Despair to not Conventional
Engagement be oneself
morality

The
Self-actualization
meaningful life needs

Meaning
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Despair to be
oneself

Principled
morality

Appendix A.
Additional detail on Winston’s (2016) theory
Winstons’s (2016) theory seeks to simplify and integrate similar theories across
epistemologies. It brings together findings within humanism, existentialism, and positive
psychology to propose a more basic developmental process that gives rise to similar
theories within these disciplines. At the base of the theory is humanistic need satisfaction
as defined by Maslow (1987). Five groups of needs are described: physiological needs,
safety security needs, belongingness needs, esteem needs, and self-actualization needs.
Physiological needs are described as the most basic needs, including nutrition, air to
breathe, and sleep. Safety security needs are the next level of humanistic development,
emphasizing personal safety and secure housing. Belongingness needs are the first to
enter the realm of the psychological. They are characterized by having a supportive
community of friends and family. The fourth level of Maslow’s (1987) hierarchy is
esteem needs, which is characterized by feeling a sense of capability and
accomplishment. The final stage of humanistic development is composed of selfactualization needs, which include a sense of purpose and personal fulfilment.
Winston argues that based on need gratification, affective environment is
determined. On the surface this is happiness as described by Seligman (2002), however it
is shadowed by despair as described by Kierkegaard (1989). Seligman’s (2002) forms of
happiness, as discussed elsewhere, are pleasure, engagement and meaning. Pleasure is a
feeling of joy, engagement is task based focus, and meaning is deep connection to
broader things.
Kierkegaard’s (1989) despair is discussed in terms of denial of unpleasant truths
about the self. Three varieties of despair are described: despair to not have a self, despair
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to not be oneself, and despair to be oneself. The least conceptually developed, despair to
not have a self represents no awareness beyond what is immediately relevant. There is no
awareness of who one is, just immediate desires and disappointments. Despair to not be
oneself is described as awareness of and resentment of who an individual is. This despair
is especially social: similar to Freudian theory, ego ideals are sought to resolve personal
discontent with who the individual is. A sense of self extends to others to account for
personal limitations. Lastly, despair to be oneself is described as the ultimate realization
of existential isolation. At this stage, the individual accepts who they are as who they
are, though they regret that they are only one person. This is the most honest stage of
development, where there is no denial of self but rather sadness at what that honesty
entails. It is a mix of personal acceptance and defeat that personhood is limited.
Winston (2016) goes a step further to suggest that these developmental processes
are not simply affective, but ontological. It is argued that in these personal transitions,
perspective on justice and morality is developed, specifically as described by Kohlberg’s
(1984) theory of moral development. The first stage of moral development discussed by
Kohlberg (1984) is preconventional morality. Moral opinions are selfish and short
sighted. There is no sense of equitable justice, morality is instead determined by power
and whether or not one can “get away” with a behavior. The second stage of moral
development is conventional morality. Moral action is described as stereotyped, based on
ethical prototypes to be a good friend and citizen. Rather than justifying behavior with
underlying ethical reasoning, conventions are prioritized. The final stage of moral
development is called alternatively postconventional and principled morality. The
emphasis here is placed on deeper themes of fairness and justice, specifically as discussed
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by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971). A behavior is not justified because an
individual is powerful enough to get away with it. Neither is a behavior justified because
others perform the behavior. A behavior justified if and only if it is morally right.
Winston’s (2016) theory collapses across these domains to suppose a three stage
developmental process underpinning all four constructs. Three lives are hypothesized:
the pleasant life, the good life, and the meaningful life. The pleasant life is the most
basic, with only physiological and safety security needs being met. Depraved conditions
lead to a desire for escape, denial, and selfishness. Specifically, gratification of these
most basic needs leads to happiness as pleasure, despair to not have a self, and
preconventional morality.
Once the most basic needs of life are gratified, the good life is realized.
Humanistic development progresses to belongingness and esteem needs, having to and
offering expertise to a community. There is a motivational drive away from selfishness,
however the deeper importance of selflessness is yet to be fully appreciated. The
logistics of selflessness are prioritized over the reasons for being selfless. Specifically,
this means happiness as engagement, despair to not be oneself, and conventional
morality.
Finally, the meaningful life is arises with gratification of the deepest humanistic
needs and self-actualization. There is an appreciation for the big picture of life, and
identification of how the individual plays a role in it. A sense of good and bad is lost, life
is taken as it is with emotional complexity and depth. Specifically, self-actualization
needs come with happiness as meaning, despair to be oneself, and principled morality.
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Appendix B.
Additional detail on development of the personal fulfilment inventory
There are four psychological constructs within Winston’s (2016) theory:
Maslow’s (1987) hierarchy of needs, measured by the FNSM; Seligman’s (2002)
personalities of happiness, measured by the OTH; Kierkegaard’s (1989) despair,
measured by the FC; and Kohlberg’s (1984) morality, measured by the EPQ and SCS.
The FNSM and OTH were selected because they are measures specifically developed for
the purpose of quantifying these theories. The FC was not developed to measure
Kierkegaard’s (1989) despair, however its three subscales are conceptually relevant. The
EPQ was not developed to measure Kohlberg’s (1984) morality, however its two
subscales are conceptually relevant to preconventional and postconventional morality.
Likewise, neither was the SCS developed for measuring Kohlberg’s (1984) morality,
however it is conceptually relevant to conventional morality. Beyond theoretical
relevance, the EPQ and SCS have been identified as predictive of morality as defined by
Kohlberg (1984; Hartman, Fok, & Zee, 2009; Heilbrun & Georges, 2011).
There are also three stages as described by Winston (2016): the pleasurable life,
stage one for the previously described psychological constructs; the good life, stage two
for the previously described psychological constructs; and the meaningful life, stage three
for the previously described psychological constructs. Seeing a three by four matrix of
theoretical relationships, there are twelve cells representing each specific psychological
construct at each of Winston’s (2016) three stages. Because a factor requires at least
three items to be identified, 36 items total will be considered for the PFI, three for each of
twelve cells.
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The PFI will be created one subscale at a time. The pleasurable life will be
created first. Items will be selected from subscales that Winston (2016) suggested
represent the pleasurable life (i.e., physiological needs and safety needs from the FNSM,
pleasure from the OTH, fear of loss of control from the FC, and relativism from the
EPQ). The same procedure will be used to create a subscale for the good life (composed
of items including the belongingness needs and esteem needs from the FNSM,
engagement from the OTH, fear of loss of social relations from the FC, and the reverse
scored SCS). Lastly, this procedure will be used to create a subscale for the meaningful
life (composed of items including the self-actualization needs from the FNSM, meaning
from the OTH, fear of loss of identity from the FC, and idealism from the EPQ). Items
that correlate with each other and have theoretical relevance to the underlying constructs
will be selected for inclusion.
Scoring of the PFI will be based on percentages. Because scales are measured at
different levels (i.e., binary, Likert scale 1 to 5 or 1 to 9), the constructs within each
subscale will be calculated as a percentage, the number of points observed divided by the
number of points possible. Constructs scores will range from 0 (representing no
experience of this construct) to 1 (representing full experience of this construct). Each of
Winston’s (2016) four constructs will then be added together as a measure of personal
fulfilment. Though individual construct score will range from 0 to 1, the final scale will
range from 0 (representing low fulfilment) to 4 (representing high fulfilment) for each of
Winston’s (2016) developmental stages.
Here is an example of scoring for the pleasure subscale. The FNSM construct is
rated out of 5, so three items rated out of 5, there will be 15 points possible. As such, the
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summed score for the three FNSM items would be added, with a possible range from 3 to
15. That said, before dividing, to allow for a response of true 0, scores must be centered.
So 3 is subtracted from the summed score and this is divided by the adjusted total points
possible, 12. The same would be done for the OTH, which is also rated out of 5. The
OTH range original range would be from 3 to 15, subtracting 3 to account for true 0 the
adjusted range would be from 0 to 12. The calculation would be the sum total value for
the OTH minus 3 all divided by 12. The FC portion, on the other hand, is made up of
binaries, so the sum total score for the three FC items would be divided by 3. No
centering is necessary because “no” is represented by 0. Lastly, the EPQ is rated out of 9
points or 27 possible points. The original range would be from 3 to 27, subtracting 3 to
allow for a true 0 gives an adjusted range of 0 to 24. Scoring would be the sum total of
the EPQ minus 3 divided by the adjusted total possible, 24.
This approach extends to the meaning subscale and the engagement subscale,
however it should be noted that the engagement subscale includes items from the SCS,
rated out of 5. As such, for the SCS construct within the engagement subscale, the final
sum of three items should be divided by 12 instead of 24 as was done with the EPQ. So
for the SCS, it would be sum total score minus 3 divided by the adjusted total possible
points, 12. These instructions will be presented in more detail at presentation of PFI
items when created, reported in Appendix A. The following equations can be used to
obtain correct values:
Pleasure=((FNSMp1+FNSMp2+FNSMp3-3)/12)+((OTHp1+OTHp2+OTHp3-3)/12)+
((FCp1+FCp2+FCp3)/3)+((EPQp1+EPQp2+EPQp3-3)/27)
Engagement=((FNSMe1+FNSMe2+FNSMe3-3)/15)+((OTHe1+OTHe2+OTHe3-3)/15)+

70

((FCe1+FCe2+FCe3)/3)+((SCS1+SCS2+SCS3-3)/15)
Meaning=((FNSMm1+FNSMm2+FNSMm3-3)/15)+((OTHm1+OTHm2+OTHm33)/15)+
((FCm1+FCm2+FCm3)/3)+((EPQm1+EPQm2+EPQm3-3)/27)
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Appendix C.
Personal fulfilment inventory questions and scoring
1).
Need satisfaction
Indicate how much you agree with the statement “I am completely satisfied with” (the
items in the list) on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
a).
1
b).
1
c).
1
d).
1
e).
1
f).
1
g).
1
h).
1
i).
1

The quality of sleep I get to feel fully rested.
2

3

4

5

3

4

5

My financial security.
2

My ability to get money whenever I need it.
2

3

4

5

The quality of the relationships I have with my friends.
2

3

4

5

How highly other people think of me.
2

3

4

5

4

5

My sense of self-worth.
2

3

I am totally comfortable with all facets of my personality.
2

3

4

5

I am finally realizing all of my innermost desires.
2

3

4

5

I completely accept all aspects of myself.
2

3

4
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5

2).
Happiness
Indicate how much you agree or disagree that the items describe you using a 5-point scale
ranged from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
a).
1
b).
1
c).
1
d).
1
e).
1
f).
1
g).
1
h).
1
i).
1

My life serves a higher purpose.
2

3

4

5

I seek out situations that challenge my skills and abilities.
2

3

4

5

I am always very absorbed in what I do.
2

3

4

5

I am rarely distracted by what is going on around me.
2

3

4

5

4

5

My life has lasting meaning.
2

3

In choosing what I do, I always take into account whether it will be pleasurable.
2

3

4

5

4

5

What I do matters to society.
2

3

I love to do things that excite my senses.
2

3

4

5

For me, the good life is the pleasurable life.
2

3

4
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5

3).
Fears
Please state whether you fear the following.
a).

Intimacy

Yes
b).

No
Social relations

Yes
c).

No
Closeness

Yes
d).

No
Powerlessness

Yes
e).

No
Inadequacy

Yes
f).

No
Weakness

Yes
g).
Yes
h).
Yes
i).
Yes

No
Failure
No
Disapproval
No
Other people’s opinions
No

Note: for the purposes of scoring, let “Yes” be represented by 1, and “No” be
represented by 0.
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4).
Morality
Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following items. Each represents a
commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in
your reaction to such matters of opinion. Rate your reaction to each statement by writing
a number to the left of each statement where:
1 = Completely disagree
2 = Largely disagree
3 = Moderately disagree
4 = Slightly disagree
5 = Neither agree nor disagree
6 = Slightly agree
7 = Moderately agree
8 = Largely agree
9 = Completely agree
____ a). Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks
might be.
____ b). The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of
benefits to be gained.
____ c). It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
____ d). Moral standards are simply personal rules that indicate how a person should
behave, and are not to be applied in making judgements of others.
____ e). Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals
should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes.
____ f). Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could
stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment.
Please read the following statements and for each check the box that best represents you.
Not at
all like
me
g). I have a hard time breaking bad
habits.
h). I get distracted easily.
i). I do things that feel good in the
moment but regret later on.
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A little
Very
like
Somewhat Mostly much like
me
like me
Like me me

Scoring:
For section 3, fear, represent “no” with 0, and “yes” with 1.
There can be considered three levels of scoring: cellular scoring, construct scoring, and
developmental scoring. There will be as many as 12 cellular scores, one for each cell of
the matrix in Figure 2. Respondents will receive a score from 0 (representing no
experience of this construct) to 1 (representing full experience of this construct).
Additionally, the scale can be scored as individual constructs, the four columns of Figure
2. For a short assessment of need satisfaction, simply add the items scores for section 1.
For a short assessment of happiness, simply add the item scores for section 2. For a short
assessment of fear, simply add the item scores for section 3. For a short assessment of
morality, simply use the following equation:
Morality=(4a+4b+4c+4d+4e+4f)+((4g+4h+4i)*9/5)
Scores would range based on their original scale measures. Humanistic need satisfaction
would range from 9 (representing no need satisfaction) to 45 (representing satisfaction of
all needs). Happiness would range from 9 (representing no feelings of positive affect) to
45 (representing feelings of diverse positive affect). Fear would range from 0
(representing no existential fears) to 9 (representing many existential fears). Lastly,
morality would range from 9 (representing no sense of moral justice) to 45 (representing
complex sense of moral justice).
Lastly, scoring can represent development as defined by Winston (2016), the three rows
of Figure 2. For scoring the PFI, place individual item scores into the following
equations:
Pleasure=((1a+1b+1c-3)/12)+((2a+2b+2c-3)/12)+((3a+3b+3c)/3)+((4a+4b+4c-3)/27)
Engagement=((1d+1e+1f-3)/15)+((2d+2e+2f-3)/15)+((3d+3e+3f)/3)+((4g+4h+4i-3)/15)
Meaning=((1g+1h+1i-3)/15)+((2g+2h+2i-3)/15)+((3g+3h+3i)/3)+((4d+4e+4f-3)/27)
Scores would range from 0 (representing low fulfilment) to 4 (representing high
fulfilment) on each of Winston’s (2016) three developmental stages.
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Abstract
There have long been considered connections between happiness, physical health, and
genetics (Abdel-Khalek, 2006; Cohen & Pressman, 2006; Diener, Lucas, & Scollon,
2006; Fredrickson, 2013a; Lyubomirsky, 2007; 2013; Newman, 2011; Pressman &
Cohen, 2005; Post, 2005). Despite the strength of these relationships, research in
molecular genetics has not been successful at fully explaining these relationships (Nes &
Røysamb, 2017). This analysis seeks to identify a plausible developmental pathway from
genetic physiology to happiness as a subjective phenomenon. A sample of 10
undergraduate students and 10 graduate students at the University of Rhode Island were
used to examine the relationships between epigenetic expression, biomarkers of stress,
and experienced happiness. Canonical correlation was used to examine underlying
patterns between a set of variables representing subjective happiness and a set of
variables representing physiology. Happiness was theoretically defined by Christine
Winston (2016) and operationalized by Tanzer et al. (manuscript 1) as an expanded
adaptation of Martin Seligman’s (2002) three authentic happiness lives. Global DNA
methylation was quantified as a marker of epigenetic modification, as well as cortisol and
interleukin-6 as markers of physiological stress response. The analysis was significant,
and correlations between variables and theoretical implications are considered.
Keywords: Authentic happiness, epigenetics, cortisol, interleukin-6
Introduction
Research into happiness has identified a close relationship between happiness and
physical health. Positive affect has been generally described as a protective factor against
illness (Abdel-Khalek, 2006; Cohen & Pressman, 2006; Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 2006;
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Fredrickson, 2013a; Newman, 2011; Pressman & Cohen, 2005; Post, 2005). A
significant association was identified between the number of positive words used in
autobiographies and life expectancy (Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001). An
experimental controlled study found exercise increases happiness (Yook, Kang, & Park,
2017). In an international sample, health behaviors (i.e., physical activity, eating habits)
associated with subjective happiness (Peltzer, Pengpid, Sodi, & Mantilla Toloza, 2017).
Conversely, negative affect has been specifically identified as a risk factor for diseases
including diabetes (DeSteno, Gross, & Kubzansky, 2013), heart disease (Boehm &
Kubzansky, 2012; Hackett & Steptoe, 2016; Sin, 2016; Trudel-Fitzgerald, Chen, Singh,
Okereke, & Kubzansky, 2016; Trudel-Fitzgerald, Gilsanz, Mittleman, & Kubzansky,
2015), stroke (Barlinn, Kepplinger, Puetz, Illigens, Bodechtel, & Siepmann, 2015), and
obesity (Hackett & Steptoe, 2016). It has been suggested that happiness has such an
effect on health that it should be taken into consideration by public health researchers
(Graham, 2008).
The physiological origins of happiness have been considered in relation to
genetics to contradictory results. Early within-subjects research on happiness identified
construct stability over time, which has been attributed to an effect of genetics
(Lyubomirsky, 2007; 2013). Furthermore, twin studies have suggested heritability rates
for happiness ranging from 30-80%. That said, when trying to identify molecular
pathways to happiness, there has been little success (Nes & Røysamb, 2017). The goal of
this analysis will be to bridge this gap between behavioral and molecular genetic findings
regarding happiness.
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To provide theoretical framework connecting behavior to physiology, it is worth
considering Gilbert Gottlieb’s (2007) probable epigenesis theory. In an effort to
contextualize gene environment interactions, four strata are defined: genetic, neural,
behavioral, and environmental. Personal development is understood as a graded process
between intertwined feedback pathways. The strata encompass that which is uniquely
personal and physiological (i.e., individual genetics and nervous system wiring) and that
which entirely contextual (i.e. behavior and environmental). Moreover, these four strata
each interact and shape adjacent strata. Neural networks are founded by individual
genetics, and give rise to behaviors. Behaviors are socially determined by contextual
environment, but physiologically underpinned by neural systems. Even the extremes of
Gottlieb’s (2007) theory are subject to feedback. Behaviors shape the environments we
live in, and individual genetic code can be “turned on” or “turned off” through epigenetic
modification.
This theory is helpful in structuring the relationship between happiness and
genetics because no two strata are so far apart that they are mechanically unrelated. This
is a possible reason for mixed results between behavioral and molecular geneticists.
Twin studies did not account for physiology at all, assuming statistically isolated
relationships are genetic underpinnings to happiness. Conversely, molecular geneticists
have studied happiness from the perspective of psychopathology, which modern
happiness researchers generally do not view as the same thing as happiness (Gable &
Haidt, 2005; Nes & Røysamb, 2017). Each side prioritizes one part of Gottlieb’s (2007)
framework without accounting for the whole system. This analysis will consider the
place of happiness within Gottlieb’s (2007) contextual framework.
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Before identifying specific aims and hypotheses, it is important to review how
happiness is defined. An important theory in the study of happiness is authentic
happiness theory from positive psychology’s founder Martin Seligman (2002). This
theory supposes three fundamental approaches to happiness: happiness as pleasure,
happiness as engagement, and happiness as meaning. Pleasure is defined as hedonistic
joy, fun and laughs. Engagement is defined as intent focus on a task such that time
stands still. Meaning is defined as a euphoric sense of fulfillment due to a connection to
something broader than the self. From here, these forms of happiness have been used to
predict various psychological outcomes (Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005; Gander,
Proyer, & Ruch, 2016; Vella-Brodrick, Park, & Peterson, 2009).
Though Seligman’s (2002) theory has been well received, it has been criticized as
shallow. Even Seligman (2012) himself ultimately abandoned the theory for well-being
theory, which broadens scope to consider happiness within a broader public health
context. Christine Winston (2016), on the other hand, sought to ground Seligman’s
(2002) theory by providing a more personal psychological context for happiness. She
synthesizes theories within the history of developmental psychology to create the
existential-humanistic-positive theory of motivation. The refined theory places happiness
as an emergent quality of greater life transitions based on need gratification. Happiness
is identified as one facet of worldview, which also includes existential despair and sense
of moral justice.
The goal of this analysis is to consider the credibility of happiness as a central
function of broader human functioning. An often inherited view of happiness is as a
simple, state-based emotion; a basic feeling (Diener, 2000; Phillips, De Freitas, Mott,
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Gruber, & Knobe, 2017; Jatupaiboon, Pan-ngum, & Israsena, 2013). Seeing close
relationships between happiness and physiological health, as well as happiness and broad
aspects of psychological development, then it would seem that happiness has deeper
connections to human functioning than emotional value alone. This analysis will seek to
identify some of the processes by which happiness operates within people. Which is the
best way to understand happiness: as an isolated emotion separated by mind-body
dualism, the received theory; or as one aspect of a larger bodily monism, the
hypothesized theory?
Aims and hypotheses
There are two aims for this analysis: to assess possible physiological
underpinnings of happiness, and to consider the aptitude of Winston’s (2016) theory
within that framework. In considering physiological underpinnings, one epimarker and
two biomarkers will be considered: global DNA methylation, interleukin-6, and cortisol.
The epimarker, global DNA methylation, was selected because it is a fundamental
mechanic by which epigenetic modification is enacted (Kurdyukov & Bullock, 2016).
Epigenetic modification occurs by enabling or restricting access to DNA so as to increase
or limit expression of proteins from specific segments. Specifically, near the sections of
DNA that code for specific proteins are CpG islands, repeated series of cytosine and
guanine that molecularly initiate the transcription process. Epigenetic modification
occurs when methyl groups attach to this area, preventing transcription (Deaton & Bird,
2011). Global DNA methylation would act as a metric for how much DNA is accessible
(Kurdyukov & Bullock, 2016). It will be taken as representing Gottlieb’s (2007) genetic
stratum of activity.
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Interleukin-6 is a cytokine released in response to stressful events to moderate
immune system response (Malven, 1993). Research examining epigenetic etiologies of
anxiety and depression have identified high rates of interleukin-6 as a possible
mechanism (Kahl et al., 2016; Murphy et al., 2015; Yehuda et al., 2015). Relating
specifically to happiness, interleukin-6 and good immune system function in general were
identified to be associated with happiness (Steptoe, Dockray, & Wardle, 2009). Lastly,
interleukin-6 has been identified as an important protein in inducing epigenetic changes
(Foran et al., 2010). Interleukin-6 will be taken as representing the neurological stratum
of Gottlieb’s (2007) theory.
Cortisol has historically been identified as eliciting fight or flight reactions. It
acts as a signaler along the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis that facilitates
physiological responses to stressors (Malven, 1993; Padgett & Glaser, 2003). This stress
response functionality is theoretically fitting because Winston’s (2016) theory places
happiness within a context of responding to environmental events. Furthermore, as with
interleukin-6, mood has been identified in relation to cortisol through research
considering epigenetic etiologies of anxiety and depression, anxious and depressed
participants higher in rates of cortisol (Kahl et al., 2016; Yehuda et al., 2015).
Specifically related to happiness, cortisol has been identified within Shelley Taylor’s
positive illusion construct (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). Positive
illusions represent bold optimism in face of daunting odds. People who employed
positive illusions tended to have lower rates of cortisol. Cortisol will be taken as
representing the neurological stratum of Gottlieb’s (2007) theory.
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These three chemicals will account for the genetic and neurological strata of
Gottlieb’s (2007) theory. The behavior stratum, and the focus of this analysis, is the
experience of subjective happiness. Happiness will be defined along the lines of
Winston’s (2016) theory using the personal fulfillment inventory that was assessed by
Tanzer et al. (manuscript 1). This measure is a 36 item questionnaire with three
subscales, one for each form of happiness as defined by Winston (2016). Lastly, the
environment stratum of Gottlieb’s (2007) theory will be accounted for by the use of the
hassles and uplifts scale (Bolt, 2001; DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988). Common
life events are provided and ranked on a scale from 1 to 3 regarding how much they were
a hassle and how much they were an uplift within the past week. This will provide a
partially objective assessment of recent environmental turbulence.
With the epimarker, two biomarkers, scales for happiness, and metric of recent
environmental hassles and uplifts, the full range of Gottlieb's (2007) contextual strata
may be quantified. It is hypothesized that there will be sizable correlations between all
variables, as Gottlieb’s (2007) interconnected feedback would imply. Seeing previous
correlations between negative affect and cortisol and interuelukin-6, it is hypothesized
that there will be a specifically negative relationships between these biomarkers and
Winston’s (2016) happiness, positive affect.
The second aim of this analysis is to consider the credibility of Winston’s (2016)
theory within Gottlieb’s (2007) framework. This will primarily be accomplished by
analyzing the relationships with each individual subscale of the personal fulfillment
inventory as indicative of experienced pleasure, engagement, and meaning. Furthermore,
developmental relationships will also be of interest. Winston’s (2016) theory expands on

85

Seligman’s (2002) with explicit foundations in developmental psychology. In evaluating
her theory, paying attention to developmental variables will be informative. Two
variables will be taken as providing developmental interpretation: years of postsecondary
education and global DNA methylation. Years of postsecondary education was selected
because it accounts for the experience based driver of personal development Winston
(2016) places at the base of her theory. Though age is often viewed as the classic
developmental variable, people of different backgrounds may have different frequencies
and extremities of life experiences. Years of postsecondary education was considered a
more standardized metric of personal development that would be theoretically more
relevant to Winston’s (2016) theory.
Changes in DNA methylation are strongest during the first years of life (Wang et
al., 2012). That said, there is an emerging line of research identifying DNA methylation
as a possible etiology for diseases with onset later than early childhood, including cancer
(Feinberg & Tycko, 2004; Fukushima et al., 2017; Jones & Laird, 1999; Zhang et al.,
2016), Alzheimer’s disease (Zawia, Lahiri, & Cardozo-Pelaez, 2009; Zhao et al., 2017),
schizophrenia (Whitton et al., 2016), alcoholism (Heilig et al., 2017), depression, and
anxiety (Bartlett, Singh, & Hunter, 2017; Dalton, Kolshus, & McLoughlin, 2014).
Outside of psychopathology, some have gone so far as to suggest that epigenetic
feedback is a normal way in which cells adapt to environmental change (Furusawa &
Kaneko, 2013), possibly a fundamental underpinning of basic functions in learning and
memory (Gluck, Mercado, & Myers, 2016). Furthermore, an epigenetic physiology
could provide physiological credibility to the stage based organization of Winston’s
(2016) theory, for which there is a long theoretical history in developmental psychology.
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Establishing epigenetic links with years of postsecondary education and happiness as
defined by Winston (2016) will be informative.
The following hypotheses can be considered. In Winston’s (2016) original
writing, pleasure is identified as generally preferred by less fulfilled people, engagement
as preferred by moderately fulfilled people, and meaning preferred by deeply fulfilled
people. The hypothesis follows then that there will be a negative correlation between
years postsecondary education and pleasure, a positive correlation with meaning, and
minimal correlation with engagement. Lastly, if DNA methylation is taken as the
physiological mechanism by which development is driven, then the hypothesis follows
that there will be a positive correlation between years postsecondary education and DNA
methylation.
Reviewing hypotheses across aims, there are a number of further hypotheses that
can be inferred based on the hypothesized relationships. It was hypothesized that there
would be negative correlations between happiness and biomarkers cortisol and
interleukin-6. Understanding the physiological mechanics of epigenetic modification via
methylation, it follows that global DNA methylation will be negatively associated with
the biomarkers. It stands to reason then that DNA methylation will have a positive
correlation with happiness, mediated by two negative correlations to and from the
biomarkers.
There remain some exploratory components to this analysis. The relationships
with hassles and uplifts are unclear. Happiness research historically has identified recent
negative events as greatly outweighing positive events, implying a negative relationship
between hassles and uplifts and happiness. More recently, there has been debate as to the
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mathematical foundations of the original work and the conditions under which this effect
is identified (Fredrickson, 2013b). The relationships with this variable will be explored.
Lastly, there can be identified a logical inconsistency across hypotheses. It was
hypothesized that there would be a positive correlation between DNA methylation and
years postsecondary education, which implies a positive correlation between all forms of
happiness and years postsecondary education. That said, it was hypothesized from theory
that there will be a negative relationship between pleasure and years postsecondary
education; a positive relationship between meaning and years postsecondary education;
and minimal relationship between engagement and years postsecondary education.
Empirically contrasting these two predictions will be important to fully understand the
developmental pathways of happiness.
Methods
Procedures
Twenty-four hours before participants joined the study, they were asked to refrain
from caffeine, alcohol, or smoking, known covariates of Cortisol (Mehl & Conner, 2012).
Additionally, they were provided with a modified version of the brief trauma
questionnaire (Schnurr, Vielhauer, Weathers, & Findler, 1999). Participants who had
experienced trauma within the past month (e.g., returning from an active combat zone)
were to be asked not to participate. No participants failed the screening. Informed
consent was acquired in compliance with the University of Rhode Island Institutional
Review Board. Surveys were administered using pen and paper. Saliva samples were
collected using the passive drool method with saliva collection tubes purchased from
Salimetrics (Salimetrics, 2018). Samples were immediately placed in a freezer at -20° C.
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Participants
Participants were 20 students at the University of Rhode Island. Specifically, ten
of them were undergraduate students (age, M=20.00 years, SD=1.15 years; 3 male, 7
female; 3 African American, 7 white), and ten of them were graduate students (age,
M=25.78 years, SD=0.83 years; 10 female; 1 Asian, 9 white). Participants were recruited
from psychology classes and were compensated with extra credit.
Materials
Saliva Samples
Cortisol was quantified within samples using the Expanded Range High
Sensitivity Salivary Cortisol Enzyme Immunoassay Kit purchased from Salimetrics
(catalog number 1-3002). Interleukin-6 was quantified within samples using Salivary IL6 ELISA Kit purchased from Salimetrics (catalog number 1-3602). DNA was prepared
using the QIAamp DNA Mini Kit (catalog number 51304). Global DNA methylation
was quantified within samples using the MethylFlash Global DNA Methylation (5-mC)
ELISA Easy Kit (Colorimetric) purchased from EpigenTek (catalog number P-1030-48).
Samples were tested in triplicate. All samples were analyzed for cortisol and interleukin6; however, only 9 samples were analyzed for DNA methylation. Due to financial
limitations, only samples with sufficiently pure DNA could be analyzed for DNA
methylation (i.e., 1.50 < 260/280 < 2.15). Nine samples were analyzed, 3 undergraduate
and 6 graduate. To air on the side of conservatism, unconditional mean imputation was
used for the remaining samples.
Though multiple imputation is often preferred to unconditional mean imputation,
this approach was avoided out of concern that relationships would be inflated within the
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canonical correlation analysis. Imputed values were calculated, and the mean of the
imputed values was insignificantly different from the mean of observed (observed, M=
0.37%, SD=0.15%; imputed, M=0.42%; SD=0.50%; t(12.02)=-0.34, p=0.7433).
Though insignificance does not necessarily mean that there is no difference, there was a
fairly small effect size between the groups (Cohen’s d=0.13). Seeing minimal evidence
of difference between the groups, unconditional mean imputation was preferred so as to
not over interpret variance observed in the sample.
Questionnaires
Two questionnaires were used: the personal fulfillment inventory and the hassles
and uplifts scale. The personal fulfillment inventory is a composite scale organized by
Tanzer et al. (manuscript 1). It is a 36-item scale that drew from five questionnaires
(specifically, the five needs satisfaction measure from Taormina & Gao, 2013; the
orientations toward happiness scale from Schueller & Seligman, 2010; the fear checklist
from Walters, 2000; the ethics position questionnaire from Forsyth, 1980; and the selfcontrol scale from Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Exploratory and confirmatory
factor analyses were performed to identify questions that were quantitatively (i.e.,
coefficient omega>0.80, significant factor loadings, majority of the variance accounted
for) and theoretically compatible with Winston’s (2016) description of happiness. There
are three subscales, one for pleasure, one for engagement, and one for meaning.
Individual items elicited various responses (i.e., binary, which of the following do you
fear; continuous, on a scale of 1 to 9 how much do you agree with the following;
continuous, on a scale of 1 to 5 how much do you agree with the following). To account
for this, responses to items were transformed in a weighted linear combination to
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standardize their scores based on proportional importance as theorized by Winston
(2016). Scores ranged from 0 (representing no experienced fulfilment) to 4 (representing
high experienced fulfillment). For more detail on this, see Tanzeret al. (manuscript 1).
The hassles and uplifts scale used here was a shortened version of a much longer
original scale. Though the full scale, created by DeLongis, Folkman, and Lazarus (1988),
includes 53 items, the version used in this analysis only used the 10 most frequent hassles
and 10 most frequent uplifts for student populations identified by Bolt (2001).
Participants are provided with a list of all items and asked to rate how much each event
has been a hassle and how much each event has been an uplift. Events are rated on a
scale from 0 (representing none or not applicable to today’s experience) to 3
(representing a great deal impactful on today’s experience). Items are rated twice, once
as a hassle and once as an uplift. An example item is “having fun,” which would likely
be rated a 0 as a hassle and a 3 as an uplift. Another example is “wasting time,” which
might be rated a 3 as a hassle and a 2 as an uplift. On individual subscales, there is a
possible range from 0 (representing no hassles or uplifts) to 60 (representing many
hassles or uplpifts). The scale used in this analysis included hassles and uplifts together
for a sum total of hassles and uplifts together, with a possible range of score from 0
(representing nothing eventful today) to 120 (representing a very eventful day).
Analytic Strategy
Canonical correlation was used to analyze the data. There were four variables of
happiness correlated with four variables for the remaining strata of Gottlieb’s (2007)
theory. The four happiness variables are as follows: pleasure, engagement, meaning, and
years of postsecondary education. Pleasure, engagement, and meaning were grouped
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together because they represent each of Winston’s (2016) three forms of happiness.
Years of postsecondary education was included with them to allow for a direct
examination of a possible developmental ordering to Winston’s (2016) theory. The four
variables of Gottlieb’s (2007) remaining strata, hereafter referred to as stress response
variables, are as follows: hassles and uplifts, cortisol, interleukin-6, and DNA
methylation. These variables were grouped together because they represent the strata of
Gottlieb’s (2007) theory in relation to the stress response framework which Winston’s
(2016) theory assumes. This will allow for a specific analysis of how Winston’s (2016)
theory of happiness acts within Gottlieb’s (2007) broader contextual framework.
It should be considered that canonical correlation is not typically used with
sample sizes as small as 20. To account for this, an a priori power analysis was
performed to assess whether or not sample size will be a limitation. The required
population effect size to have at least 80% power with a 5% type 1 error rate was
calculated to be R2=0.41. In psychology research, this is often considered a very large
effect size, and may be a limitation for the analysis. This issue may be mitigated because
lab sciences tend to have larger effect sizes than social sciences. Chemical assays were
performed in triplicate to reduce error and more easily identify and remove obvious
outliers.
Even if the true population effect size is R2=0.26, the standard definition of large
according to Cohen (1992), power was calculated to remain at 0.43. Though this is much
lower than would be desired, it is not uncommon for studies within psychology research
to have power of this magnitude (Aberson, 2011). Though the effectiveness of this
analysis may rely on a large effect size, that is not unrealistic because subscales of
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happiness were compiled with careful attention to their relationships to each other, and
impure saliva samples were excluded.
Results
Overall Results
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1. Generally speaking, participants
experienced moderate amounts of happiness as pleasure or meaning, and lower amounts
of happiness as engagement (meaning: M=2.51, SD=0.42; pleasure: M=2.36, SD=0.35;
engagement: M=1.87, SD=0.34). Half of participants were graduate students, and half
were undergraduate, the mean number of years postsecondary education was 4.65 years
(SD=2.40 years). Participants generally did not experience too many impactful hassles
and uplifts (M=35.18 hassles and uplifts, SD=12.29 hassles and uplifts). Cortisol counts
were relatively small (M=0.49 ug/dL, SD=0.20 ug/dL); though smaller in absolute
volume, interleukin-6 had larger variation within the sample (M=1.93 pg/mL, SD=1.43
pg/mL). Estimates of overall DNA methylation were quite low (M=0.37%, SD=0.15%).
Distributions were examined for normality (i.e., skewness <|1.0|, kurtosis <|2.0|).
DNA methylation and happiness as engagement were a bit skewed and kurtotic, but not
unreasonably so (DNA methylation: skewness = 2.56, kurtosis = 6.97; engagement:
skewness = 2.19, kurtosis = 4.99). Additionally, omega was low for the pleasure and
meaning subscales of the personal fulfillment inventory (pleasure: omega = 0.63;
meaning: omega = 0.56). It is likely this was because the sample was half undergraduate
students and half graduate students. Though this is not ideal, it is not expected to have
had a great impact on the results. This issue will be examined further in the discussion.
The remaining variables were considered appropriate for research samples.
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Simple bivariate correlations were first examined between each pair of variables.
Correlations between happy variables can be found in Table 2, stress response variables
in Table 3, and across sets of variables in Table 4. Correlations were frequently
insignificant, however this may be due to the small sample size. Contrary to
expectations, years postsecondary education had a positive relationship with pleasure (r =
0.20), and a negative relationship with engagement (r = -0.25) and meaning (r = -0.52).
Meaning had a moderate positive relationship with both engagement and pleasure
(pleasure: r = 0.33; engagement: r = 0.31), however there was a small and negative
relationship between engagement and pleasure (r = -0.14).
Correlations within stress response variables were generally negative and
moderate to small. The strongest correlations were between DNA methylation and the
biomarkers, strongest for cortisol (r=-0.57) but still moderately large a relationship with
interleukin-6 (r=-0.39). This was in line with the hypothesis. The only positive
correlation was between cortisol and interleukin-6 (r=0.10), as was hypothesized. Global
DNA methylation had a negative correlation with hassles and uplifts (r=-0.30). There
was no significant or meaningful relationship between hassles and uplifts and biomarkers
(cortisol: r=-0.07; interleukin-6: after rounding, r=0.00).
Correlations between the two sets of variables were mixed positive versus
negative, though generally nonsignificant. DNA methylation had a negative and large
correlation with pleasure and meaning (pleasure: r=-0.74; meaning: r=-0.52). Though it
remained a negative association, the correlation was much smaller between engagement
and DNA methylation (r=-0.04). Seeing a small sample size, this may not be a
meaningful relationship. A similar pattern was observed for cortisol, which had positive
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and moderate correlations with pleasure and meaning (pleasure: r=0.29; meaning:
r=0.32) and a very small correlation with engagement (r=0.07). Interleukin-6 had
negative correlations with all variables of happiness, however the strongest relationships
were with engagement (r=-0.24) and meaning (r=-0.13) and virtually no correlation with
pleasure (r=-0.01). Happiness as pleasure had a negative and small correlation with
hassles and uplifts (r=-0.10), a large correlation with meaning (r=0.49), and the largest
correlation with engagement (r=0.70). Older students tended to have fewer hassles and
uplifts (r=-0.40) and concentrations of interleukin-6 (r=-0.06) and larger percentages of
DNA methylation (r=0.39). There were few differences by years of postsecondary
education for rates of cortisol (r=-0.06).
Canonical correlation was used to examine in more detail the relationship
between variables of happiness as defined by Winston (2016) (i.e., happiness as pleasure,
engagement, meaning, and years postsecondary education) and stress response variables
(i.e., hassles and uplifts, cortisol, interleukin-6, and global DNA methylation). The
results can be found in Tables 5 and 6. Overall, the model was significant (for Wilk’s
lambda, F(16, 37.298)=2.75, p=0.0055) and accounted for the vast majority of the
variance (eta2=0.91). Only the first linear combination was significant (linear
combination 1: F(16, 37.298)=2.75, p=0.0055). That said, the second linear combination
was nearly significant (F(9, 31.79)=1.92, p=0.0851) and accounted for a large amount of
shared variance across the linear combinations (linear combination 1: 63%; linear
combination 2: 32%). One possible reason for its near significance is the small sample
size. Briefly reviewing the canonical coefficients (presented in Table 7), it would appear
that the first function prioritizes hassles and uplifts while the second linear combination
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prioritizes DNA methylation. Seeing near significance, a large proportion of shared
variance, and theoretical relevance, the second linear combination will be included in the
analysis despite being nonsignificant.
Function 1
Table 7 provides model estimates. Reviewing the estimates for happiness within
the first function, this linear combination seems to represent the developmental
progression towards deeper conceptions of happiness (i.e., meaning and engagement).
These provided the largest canonical coefficients (meaning: standardized loading=0.68;
engagement: standardized loading=0.67). Furthermore, the canonical coefficient for
pleasure was moderately large and negative (standardized loading=-0.50). Years
postsecondary education had a moderate positive canonical coefficient (standardized
loading=0.34).
Stress response variables for the first function drew primarily from hassles and
uplifts. The largest loading was for hassles and uplifts, a large and positive influence
(standardized loading=0.94). Cortisol and DNA methylation did have an influence on the
function, however it was moderate (cortisol: standardized loading=0.39; DNA
methylation: standardized loading=0.43). Interleukin-6 had a moderately small negative
canonical coefficient (standardized loading=-0.29). This function can be interpreted as
the relationship between stress and health: experience of recent life events paired with
bodily response.
Reviewing the correlations between the canonical function for happiness and the
variables of happiness, correlations were strong and directionally similar to as
hypothesized. The correlation between the happiness function and pleasure was
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moderate and negative (r=-0.30) while the relationship between the happiness function
and meaning was large and positive (r=0.54). Year in college had a moderate and
negative relationship with the happy function (r=-0.28). Contrary to expectations, the
strongest correlation with the happiness function was engagement, resulting in a very
large positive correlation (r=0.86).
Correlations between the canonical function for stress response and the variables
of stress response were mixed. As hypothesized, there was a negative correlation
between the stress response function and interleukin-6 (r=-0.29) as well as a small,
positive correlation between the function and DNA methylation (r=0.17). Additionally,
there was a positive correlation between hassles and uplifts and the stress response
function (r=0.83). Contrary to expectations, there was a positive relationship between the
stress response function and cortisol, however it was a small relationship (r=0.11).
Next, correlations were considered between the stress response function and the
variables of happiness. The pattern of correlations was similar to the pattern observed for
the happiness function. There were large, positive relationships for meaning and
engagement (meaning: r=0.46; engagement: r=0.74), a small negative relationship for
pleasure (r=-0.28), and a small negative relationship with years postsecondary education
(r=-0.24). Likewise, the pattern of correlations between the happiness function and the
variables of stress response variables were similar to their correlations with the stress
response function. There were positive relationships for hassles and uplifts and DNA
methylation (hassles and uplifts: r=0.71; interleukin-6: r=0.15), a rather small positive
relationship with cortisol (r=0.09), and a moderate negative relationship with interleukin6 (r=-0.31). These results indicate close relationships across Gottlieb’s (2007) strata.
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Redundancy analysis indicated the meaningful content of the functions. The
ability to predict happiness variables using the stress response function demonstrated
strength in predicting meaning and engagement (meaning: R2=0.21; engagement:
R2=0.55) with much less ability to predict pleasure or years postsecondary education
(pleasure: R2=0.07; years postsecondary education, R2=0.06). The happiness function
was more balanced in its predictions, predicting cortisol and hassles and uplifts most of
all with much less ability to predict interleukin-6, cortisol, and DNA methylation (hassles
and uplifts: R2=0.50; interleukin-6: R2=0.09; cortisol: R2=0.01; DNA methylation:
R2=0.02). Development as Winston (2016) defined demonstrated changes in how hassles
and uplifts are experienced most of all with some changes in physiology.
This point is further examined by the combined effect sizes of the canonical
functions, provided in Table 8. The happy function generally was more effective at
predicting both happy variables and stress response variables (happy function predicting
happy variables: R2=0.30; happy function predicting stress response variables: R2=0.22).
That said, the stress response function did predict a moderate amount of variance. Both
functions did similarly well at predicting the opposing variables, accounting for a
moderately large amount of the variance for both happy and stress response variables
(stress response function predicting stress response variables: R2=0.21; stress response
function predicting stress response variables: R2=0.16). Altogether, both linear
combinations were quite effective at predicting all variables, accounting for nearly three
quarters of the variance (R2=0.73).
Function 2
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The second happy function analyzed, also presented in Table 7, seemed to
represent happiness pleasure. By far, the largest loading was happiness as pleasure, a
large and positive addition to the linear combination (standardized loading=1.00). This
was counterbalanced by a large and negative canonical coefficient from years
postsecondary education (standardized loading=-0.53). Theoretically in line with
Winston’s (2016) ordering, there was a small and negative canonical coefficient for
meaning (standardized loading=-0.10) and a moderately small positive coefficient for
engagement (standardized loading=0.24). This function seems to represent low
fulfillment high in pleasure and some engagement with diminishing feelings of meaning.
The second stress response function, on the other hand, was dominated by global
DNA methylation, specifically whether or not DNA was unmethylated (standardized
loading=-0.99). There was a small positive canonical coefficient for hassles and uplifts
(standardized loading=0.13). There was virtually no interaction with cortisol
(standardized loading=0.01) and contrary to expectations a small negative canonical
coefficient for interleukin-6 (standardized loading=-0.18). This function is defined by a
lack of DNA methylation, with some influence of interleukin-6 and hassles and uplifts.
Examining correlations between the happiness function and happy variables, there
was a close relationship between pleasure and the happy function (r=0.82). As
hypothesized, there was a moderate relationship between the happy function and
engagement (r=0.33). An unexpected finding was that there was a large correlation
between the happy function and meaning (r=0.58). Lastly, as was hypothesized, there
was a moderate negative relationship between the happy function and years
postsecondary education (r=-0.34).
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Correlations between the stress response function and stress response variables
were more straightforward. There was a large negative relationship between the stress
response function and global DNA methylation (r=-0.98). As hypothesized, there was a
moderate positive relationships between the stress response function and cortisol
(r=0.40). Though it was directionally as hypothesized, there was a very small positive
relationship between the stress response function and interleukin-6 (r=0.06), so this may
not be a meaningful relationship. There was a moderate positive correlation between the
stress response function and hassles and uplifts (r=0.30). This provides evidence for
DNA methylation as an underlying regulator of physiological stress response.
A similar pattern of results was identified when correlating the stress response
function with the happy variables. There were moderately large positive relationships
between pleasure and meaning and the stress response function (pleasure: r=0.63;
meaning: r=0.44) with a moderate correlation with engagement (r=0.15). There was a
moderate negative relationship between years postsecondary education and the stress
response function (r=-0.26). As with the first function, there was also a similar pattern of
results when correlating the happy function with the stress response variables. The
strongest relationship was between global DNA methylation and the happy function, a
large negative relationship (r=-0.75). There were moderate correlations between the
happy function and cortisol and hassles and uplifts (cortisol: r=0.31; hassles and uplifts:
r=0.23) with a very small relationship between the happy function and interleukin-6
(r=0.04). These confirm the first function’s findings of close relationships across
Gottlieb’s (2007) strata.
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The redundancy analyses demonstrated again greater ability to predict happy
variables. The stress response function accounted for nearly half of the variance in all of
pleasure, engagement, and meaning (pleasure: R2=0.47; engagement: R2=0.57; meaning:
R2=0.41). Though less predictive, the stress response function still predicted a moderate
amount of variance within years postsecondary education (R2=0.13). The happiness
function was very effective at predicting stress DNA methylation and hassles and uplifts
(DNA methylation: R2=0.56; hassles and uplifts: R2=0.58). It was less effective at
predicting cortisol and interleukin-6 (cortisol: R2=0.10; interleukin-6: R2=0.10).
Finally, the variance explained overall, presented in Table 8, was similarly
effective for stress response variables and happiness variables alike. Most effective were
functions predicting their own variables (happiness function predicting happiness
variables: R2=0.29; stress response function predicting stress response variables:
R2=0.30). That said, there was still a moderate amount of variance explained by function
predicting opposing variables (happiness function predicting stress response: R2=0.17;
stress response function predicting happiness variables: R2=0.18). Lastly, the set of
variables overall accounted for the majority of the variance across all eight variables
(R2=0.59).
Discussion
Generally speaking, these results provided preliminary evidence for relationships
between happiness and a physiology of stress response. Limited by a small sample size,
many bivariate correlations were nonsignificant, however the estimated coefficients were
often substantial. When accounting for the multivariate environment, the functions
demonstrated clear relevance to Winston’s (2016) theoretical ordering. Though the
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details of how the biomarkers interrelated varied, it was clear that there were
relationships across strata of Gottlieb’s (2007) framework. There were two aims to this
analysis: to assess in detail the physiology of a stress response based view of happiness;
and to examine with data a developmental framework to Winston’s (2016) theory of
happiness. These points will be considered in detail in the following sections.
Physiologies of happiness
The first aim was to assess the physiology of happiness within Gottlieb’s (2007)
framework. It was hypothesized that there would be negative correlations between
measures of happiness (i.e., pleasure, engagement, and meaning) and stress response
system functioning (i.e., biomarkers interleukin-6 and cortisol). A check of bivariate
correlations was mixed: participants high in interleukin-6 tended to be low in all forms of
happiness as hypothesized. Contrary to the hypothesis, participants high in cortisol
tended to be also high in all forms of happiness. What will be most informative will be to
consider each form of happiness individually. Winston (2016) argued that happiness
functions in developmental stages. Though a person may experience any form of
happiness moment to moment, it is posited that there are stable preferences that develop
over time. Examining physiologies of happiness within context will clarify the
relationships between stress response system functioning and happiness in detail.
The first function seemed to represent the presence of mature happiness. As
hypothesized, people who were low in interleukin-6 also tended to be high in happiness.
That said, contrary to expectations people who tended to be high in cortisol tended to also
be high in mature happiness. One possible explanation for this is that the relationship
was fairly small, much smaller than the relationship between hassles and uplifts and
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mature experiences of happiness. It is possible that the high rates of cortisol are due to
high rates of hassles and uplifts moreso than experienced happiness. In other words, one
possibility is that people who are happier tend to live more turbulent lives. At the same
time, people who live more turbulent lives may also tend to have more cortisol because of
that turbulence. All in all, this was a correlational analysis, so it is not possible to assess
causality, although future researchers may want to examine the role of cortisol in more
detail.
The results from the second function were even more counter to the hypothesis.
The linear combination seemed to represent the experience of happiness as pleasure. It
was hypothesized that people high in happiness would be low and cortisol and
interleukin-6. The result was a positive relationship, indicating happy people tended to
have higher rates of both cortisol and interleukin-6. Though this was in opposition to the
original hypotheses, it should be taken as a confirmation of Winston’s (2016) theory.
Within her developmental ordering, happiness as pleasure is viewed as the least mature
form of happiness. If this linear combination represents the presence of immature
happiness, then the hypothesis needs to be revised to expect a positive relationship with
cortisol and interleukin-6. In other words, people high in immature happiness would also
be high in biomarkers of stress. The second function demonstrated this clearly.
This counterintuitive result may be because of Simpson’s paradox. The original
hypotheses were not tailored to each definition of happiness within Winston’s (2016)
theory. The theory is fundamentally stage based. Individually, one can increase
happiness for one stage, but there is implied an overall trend from relatively unsatisfied
when preferring happiness as pleasure toward relatively deeply satisfied with happiness
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as meaning. This was worked into the very measurement of variables: the personal
fulfillment inventory provides individual subscales representing fulfillment of each
stratified stage. Happiness was measured such that an increase on any subscale would
imply an increase in happiness. The true nature of happiness may not be so reductionist.
An increase on happiness as pleasure may not be proportionally as relevant as an increase
on happiness as meaning. A person high in pleasure will be measured as very happy, but
the theory would imply that such a person is not very happy at all. For this reason, a
positive relationship between happiness as pleasure and biomarkers of stress was taken as
providing some confirmation of the hypothesis and Winston’s (2016) theory.
Lastly, there remains the exploratory analysis of hassles and uplifts. Results were
consistent: in both functions of happiness, there was a positive relationship with hassles
and uplifts. Reviewing the descriptive statistics stratified between hassles and uplifts,
participants generally experienced more uplifts than hassles, which may be informative.
Historically, research has indicated that recalled hassles tend to outweigh recalled uplifts
and negatively affect perceived happiness (Fredrickson, 2013b). That said, these results
indicate otherwise. Participants tended to remember more uplifts than hassles, and those
who recalled more events in general tended to be happier across functions of happiness.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that there was a closer relationship between
hassles and uplifts for mature happiness than for happiness as pleasure. This may be
theoretically relevant. In her original theory, Winston (2016) suggests that the deepest
levels of happiness, when experienced as meaning, are inherently value neutral.
Definitions of good and bad are redefined by their broader meaningful implications. A
close relationship between hassles and uplifts and meaning may indicate greater
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emotional depth from all experiences. The stress of hassles in particular may have been
less likely to reduce happiness as meaning than happiness as pleasure.
Developmental definitions of happiness
There were two developmental variables considered in the analysis: years
postsecondary education and global DNA methylation. Years postsecondary education,
which will be considered first, was taken as representational of Winston’s (2016)
experience-based view of happiness. It was hypothesized that years postsecondary
education would correlate negatively with pleasure, positively with meaning, and have
minimal relation with engagement. It was expected that people with fewer professional
experiences (i.e., few years of postsecondary education) would prefer happiness as
pleasure; people with more professional experiences (i.e., many years of postsecondary
education) would prefer happiness as meaning; and happiness as engagement would be
developmentally in the middle. A check of bivariate correlations revealed the reverse of
these hypotheses. As students spent more time at universities, they tended to appreciate
pleasure more. Likewise, older students tended to appreciate meaning less. Though the
progression was reverse what had been expected, the ordering was intact. Engagement
did demonstrate a negative correlation, but it was not as strong a relationship as was
demonstrated for pleasure or meaning. Examining the multivariate results will be
informative for teasing apart this unexpected ordering.
Though the bivariate correlations were opposite what was expected, the linear
combinations provided clearer evidence in support of Winston’s (2016) theory. The first
function seemed to represent increasing depth of happiness, and there was a positive
canonical coefficient for years postsecondary education. In other words, when the data
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were modeled to maximize relationships among all variables, older students tended to
have more mature conceptions of happiness. The same can be said for the second
function, which seemed to represent happiness as pleasure. In this case, the canonical
coefficient was negative. In other words, students high in pleasure, experiencing
immature feelings of happiness, tended to be younger.
Perhaps most informative to why bivariate correlations were so different from the
canonical coefficients is to examine the correlations between the happy function and
years of postsecondary education: in both cases, the correlations were negative. It may
be that older students were less happy in general than younger students. To isolate years
of postsecondary education may be to isolate the one aspect of a global loss of happiness
that comes with advanced study. The linear combinations seek to maximize relationships
within the data across all variables. It is only by accounting for variance across all forms
of happiness as defined by Winston (2016) that the trend appears as hypothesized. As
before, this may be an effect of measurement. It may be in separating happiness into
subscales that the results get complicated, even if the canonical coefficients are clearly as
can be hypothesized from Winston (2016).
The other developmental variable was DNA methylation. It was hypothesized
that there would be negative relationships between DNA methylation and cortisol and
biomarkers (i.e., cortisol and interleukin-6). Within Winston’s (2016) developmental
framework, it was hypothesized that older students would have higher rates of DNA
methylation. A check of bivariate correlations confirms many of these hypotheses.
Participants with highly methylated DNA had lower rates of cortisol and interleukin-6
and tended to be older.

106

Within the multivariate context, results were mixed. In the first function, there
was a positive estimate for DNA methylation and a negative estimate for interleukin-6 as
hypothesized, but a positive estimate for cortisol. As previously discussed, this may be
because of relationships between cortisol and hassles and uplifts. Hassles and uplifts
were very influential within the first linear combination and cortisol is sensitive to recent
experiences. It is possible this dependency between these variables complicated the
relationship with cortisol. The second function also had an unexpected result, this time
between DNA methylation and interleukin-6 both estimated negative. This may be due
to the double role interleukin-6 plays as inflammation cytokine and molecular facilitator
of DNA methylation. There may be true associations between DNA methylation and
interleukin-6 that complicate model fitting. Furthermore, the linear combination was
largely defined by DNA methylation, which may have pulled out this dependency
between these two variables. Lastly, this unexpected result disappeared when
interleukin-6 was correlated with the linear combination. Put simply, there seem to be
multiple relationships between DNA methylation and interleukin-6 here documented.
The hypothesized relationships between DNA methylation and positive
psychological constructs (i.e., pleasure, engagement, meaning) were logically
inconsistent, making full hypothesis evaluation uncertain. One possibility was positive
relationships between all variables of happiness and DNA methylation, as implied by
hypothesized relationships with biomarkers. Alternatively, it could also be hypothesized
that there would be a positive relationship with meaning, a negative relationship with
pleasure, and minimal relationship with engagement, as implied by hypothesized
relationships with years postsecondary education. The observed bivariate correlations
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confirmed neither of these expectations: participants who had highly methylated DNA
tended to be lower in all forms of happiness. This may be because of the general nature
of global DNA methylation. This metric was selected as an overall metric of personal
physiological development. What was gained by being general came at a loss to
specificity. This variable accounted for genome wide DNA methylation, including many
unquantified proteins.
Within the multivariate context, DNA methylation’s relationships to the happiness
function were closer to hypotheses. Participants with highly methylated DNA tended to
experience mature feelings of happiness, demonstrated in the first function as
hypothesized. In the second function, participants with highly methylated DNA tended to
experience less pleasure. Pleasure being the least mature form of happiness, it is
expected that there would be a negative relationship. And these data supported this.
Participants who enjoyed pleasure tended to have unmethylated DNA. This provides
evidence for the developmentally implied hypotheses of happiness. These results
together do provide evidence in support of a physiological view of Winston’s (2016)
theory. Questions about the mediating pathways from DNA methylation to experienced
happiness, though this is likely in part because of the general measure of DNA
methylation used.
The relationship between years postsecondary education and DNA methylation
within the multivariate analysis were as hypothesized. The first function estimated a
positive coefficient for DNA methylation, and there was a positive coefficient for years
postsecondary education. Likewise, in the second function, DNA methylation had a
negative estimated coefficient, and there was a negative coefficient for years
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postsecondary education. Across both functions, DNA methylation was mirrored by
years postsecondary education.
Lastly, in the exploratory analysis of the relationships to hassles and uplifts, there
was less consistency than was observed in happiness. In both functions, hassles and
uplifts had a positive estimate, whereas DNA methylation changed from a positive
estimate in the mature happiness function to a large negative estimate in the pleasure
function. This may be a difference in objectivity between hassles and uplifts and DNA
methylation. Whereas happiness and perceived hassles and uplifts share large
psychological characteristics, there is less direct a relationship between DNA methylation
and hassles and uplifts. Hassles and uplifts are not entirely psychological, but partially
influenced by random events of daily experience. This may have added enough noise to
the data to change these relationships that were stronger between DNA methylation and
happiness. Furthermore, even within Gottlieb’s (2007) theory, genetics and environment
have a mediated connection, but are on opposite theoretical extremes. This may be a
demonstration of their distance from each other.
Limitations and future directions
What may have been a limitation of this analysis was the low metrics of internal
consistency for the personal fulfillment inventory. This is likely because the sample was
made of a mix of undergraduate and graduate students. Moreover, it was likely that six
specific items on the questionnaire likely were of specific issue: “Moral standards are
simply personal rules that indicate how a person should behave, and are not be applied in
making judgments of others,” “Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so
complex that individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes,”
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“Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in
the way of better human relations and adjustment,” on the pleasure subscale; and “Risks
to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be,” “The
existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be
gained,” and, “The dignity and welfare of the people should be the most important
concern in any society,” on the meaning subscale.
These items are included on the scale because they represent conceptions of
morality, an important aspect of Winston’s (2016) theory. That said, they are the most
wordy and complicated questions on the questionnaire. There was one student, an
undergraduate, who upon turning in his questionnaire packet said to the researcher that
these six questions made no sense to him. It is likely that graduate students and
undergraduate students responded to these questions differently, resulting in low metrics
of internal consistency for the pleasure and meaning subscales. The personal fulfillment
inventory was normed on a sample of undergraduate students (Tanzer et al., manuscript
1), and though it originally showed appropriate internal consistency among
undergraduate students, the mixed sample may have resulted in the low values.
That said, though internal consistency was a limitation, it was not seen as the
largest threat to validity. In the original study where the personal fulfilment inventory
was compiled, these complicated questions added little meaningful variance to the scale
overall (i.e., low and nonsignificant factor loadings for the majority of the questions, see
manuscript 1). The items were included in the analysis for theoretical value, but it was
not expected that they would be statistically influential. Though it would have been
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preferred to have better observed internal consistency, the low values were not seen as
the largest limitation to the results.
What was a larger limitation to this study was the sample size. For a canonical
correlation analysis, 20 participants is generally viewed as quite small (Harlow, 2014).
Moreover, due to differences in DNA preparation quality, not all of the samples could
have been tested. Imputing simple averages for missing data was taken as a step to be
conservative, however future research would benefit from a larger sample with complete
data. Furthermore, though not unreasonably so, DNA methylation was fairly skewed and
kurtotic. Furthermore, the second linear combinations were dominated by happiness as
pleasure and DNA methylation, suggesting there may have been multicollinearity.
Replication of results would be valuable.
Another direction especially if future researchers have a larger sample would be a
mediational design. The size of the sample was so small that a mediational analysis was
not considered an analytic option, however the research question was mediational in
conceptualization. The full hypothesized path was from DNA methylation, to
interleukin-6, to cortisol, to happiness, to hassles and uplifts, the whole span of Gottlieb’s
(2007) strata. This correlational approach identified a relationship between methylation
and happiness, but in theory this direct effect would be subsumed by a mediated effect.
With a larger sample, a longitudinal mediation analysis would be informative as to
whether or not methylation alone has an effect on happiness, or if it is as hypothesized
only correlated because of the physiological mechanics facilitating the relationship.
Alternatively, repeated measures could be used to investigate the temporal ordering of
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these relationships. A cross lagged panel design could investigate the assumed but
untested causality underlying these results.
Being able to assess causality and mediation within these mechanics is important
because there were many covariates that were not included in the analysis. First of all,
participants were all highly educated, and correlated therewith likely of a higher
socioeconomic status. Though there appears to be minimal effect of socioeconomic
status on happiness (Lyubomirsky, 2007), it is a well-documented limitation within the
field of psychology that marginalized populations are understudied (Matsumoto & Van
de Vijver, 2010). Outside of dependencies relating to socioeconomic status, students are
generally quite young. Winston’s (2016) theory emphasized a lifelong developmental
process transitioning existential experiences of happiness. Future researchers should
consider sampling more demographically diverse populations, especially so far as it
relates to socioeconomic status and age.
Future research could also examine different biomarkers. Cortisol and
interleukin-6 were selected because they are directly related to stress response system
functioning and a primary goal of this analysis was to place happiness in a stress response
framework. That said, there are other neuropeptides that interact with stress response
system functioning that may seem more intuitive choices for studying happiness. One
such neuropeptide is oxytocin. Oxytocin historically has been identified as facilitating
maternal functions, such as the release of milk during lactation and uterine contractions
(Rosenzweig, Breedlove, & Leiman, 1996). In recent years, oxytocin has been the
subject of study among positive psychologists for its relationship to calming and social
bonding. It is so popular in the study of gentleness and tenderness that it is sometimes
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given the moniker “cuddle hormone” (Fredrickson, 2013c; Neff, 2011; Sapolsky, 2017).
Another alternative neuropeptide of possible interest for future researchers is beta
endorphin. Beta endorphin is an endogenous opioid that acts as a pain reliever
(Rosenzweig, Breedlove, & Leiman, 1996), it has also been suggested as facilitating a
sense of greater life purpose (Ishida 2012). Examining the relationships between these
neuropeptides, and others, will be informative to understanding the physiology of
happiness in greater detail.
Beyond expanding biomarkers considered, another possible direction would be to
examine different epimarkers. Global DNA methylation was selected because the goal of
this analysis was exploratory, and global DNA methylation is a general metric of overall
epigenetic modification. That said, much more detail could be provided into the
underlying epigenetic mechanics. For example, specific methylation on CpG islands near
the binding sites of biomarkers would be strong evidence for epigenetic modulation of
the expression of happiness. Further yet, this study did not sequence DNA itself. Future
researchers should consider the most complete theoretical path, including genetic
sequence, epigenetic modification, protein production, and finally expression of
happiness.
Conclusion
The fundamental goal of this analysis was to identify a personal physiology that
may mechanically facilitate happiness as a subjective phenomenon. Seeing close
relationships between happiness and health, the question was posed as to whether or not
happiness exists within a broader frame of psychological and physiological functioning.
It was hypothesized that global DNA methylation would interact with the expression of
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biomarkers for stress response, which in turn would interact with experienced happiness.
On the most basic level the results were clear. People with highly methylated DNA
tended to have lower rates of biomarkers of stress, and higher reports of subjective
happiness. Though more can be done to examine the pathways between stress response
and happiness, this analysis provided initial evidence in favor of happiness existing
within a stress response theoretical framework.
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Table 1.
Descriptive statistics
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max Skew

Kurt

Omega

Pleasure

2.36

0.35

1.60

3.10 -0.12

0.38

0.63

Engagement

1.87

0.34

1.53

2.93

2.19

4.99

0.90

Meaning

2.51

0.42

1.60

3.18 -0.26

-0.31

0.56

Years postsecondary education

4.65

2.40

1.00

8.00

0.14

-1.53

Hassles and uplifts

35.18

12.29 13.00 69.00 0.67

1.97

Cortisol (ug/dL)

0.49

0.20

0.20

0.81 -0.05

-1.34

Interleukin-6 (pg/mL)

1.93

1.43

0.00

5.55

0.73

0.61

Global DNA methylation (%)

0.37

0.15

0.27

0.74

2.56

6.97

Happiness

Stress response
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0.88

Table 2.
Correlations within variables of happiness

Pleasure
Pleasure
Engagement
(r, p)
Meaning
(r, p)
Years postsecondary
education
(r, p)

Engagement Meaning

1.00
-0.14
0.5549
0.33
0.1563

0.31
0.1907

1.00

0.20
0.3954

-0.25
0.2875

-0.52
0.0187

Years
postsecondary
education

1.00

125

1.00

Table 3.
Correlations within stress response variables
Daily
hassles
Daily hassles
(r, p)
Cortisol
(r, p)
Interleukin-6
(r, p)
Global DNA
methylation
(r, p)

Cortisol

Interleukin-6

Global DNA
methylation

1.00
-0.07
0.7534
-0.00
0.9953

1.00
0.10
0.6709

1.00

-0.30
0.4343

-0.57
0.1097

-0.34
0.3709

126

1.00

Table 4.
Correlations between variables of happiness and stress response

Daily
hassles
(r, p)
Cortisol
(r, p)
Interleukin-6
(r, p)
Global DNA
methylation
(r, p)

Pleasure
(r, p)

Engagement
(r, p)

Meaning
(r, p)

Years postsecondary
education
(r, p)

-0.10
0.6787
0.29
0.2196
-0.01
0.9612

0.70
0.0007
0.07
0.7817
-0.24
0.3024

0.49
0.0287
0.32
0.1735
-0.13
0.5956

-0.40
0.0777
-0.06
0.7921
-0.19
0.4226

-0.74
0.0220

-0.04
0.9222

-0.52
0.1495

0.39
0.2980
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Table 5.
Overall canonical correlation results

Wilks' Lambda

Lambda

F

0.092

2.75

Numerator Denominator
df
df
16

128

37.298

P

Eta2

0.0055

0.907

Table 6.
Linear combination results

Linear
combination

Adj
Canon
Corr

SE

Shared
Shared cumulative
Eigenvalue variance variance

F

Num df

Denom df

p

1

0.795

0.061

2.7545

0.632

0.632

2.75

16

37.298

0.0055

2

0.743

0.095

1.415

0.325

0.957

1.92

9

31.789

0.0851

3

0.269

0.197

0.1646

0.038

0.995

0.64

4

28

0.6402

4

0

0.224

0.0222

0.005

1.000

0.33

1

15

0.5727
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Table 7.
Standardized coefficients, correlations, and individual redundancy analysis
Function 1
Variable

Coefficient

rh

rs

Function 2
Redundancy
analysis

Coefficient

rh

rs

Redundancy
analysis

Happiness
Pleasure

-0.50

-0.30 -0.26

0.07

1.00

0.83

0.63

0.47

Engagement

0.67

0.86 0.74

0.55

0.24

0.20

0.15

0.57

Meaning

0.68

0.54 0.46

0.21

-0.10

0.58

0.44

0.41

Years
postsecondary
education

0.34

-0.28 -0.24

0.06

-0.53

-0.34

-0.26

0.13

Daily hassles

0.94

0.83 0.71

0.50

0.13

0.30

0.23

0.56

Cortisol

0.39

0.11 0.09

0.01

0.01

0.40

0.31

0.10

Interleukin-6

-0.29

-0.36 -0.31

0.09

-0.18

0.06

0.04

0.10

Global DNA
methylation

0.43

0.17 0.15

0.02

-0.99

-0.98

-0.75

0.58

Stress response

Note: rh represents correlations with the happiness function and and rs represents
correlation with the stress response function
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Table 8.
Overall redundancy analysis

Function
Happy
canonical
function
Stress response
canonical
function
R2

Function 1
Happy
Stress response
variables
variables

Function 2
Happy
Stress response
variables
variables

0.3019

0.2215

0.2941

0.1723

0.1574

0.2146

0.1769

0.3019

0.7337

0.5859
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